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ABSTRACT 
 
In the recent years, the world saw a rapid expansion of China’s foreign direct 
investment (FDI). From the start of the new century, EU as one of the world’s largest 
economies has enjoyed rocketing growth of FDI inflow from China. As the main force 
in foreign investment operations, Chinese state-owned enterprises (CSOE) are eager to 
extend their business to Europe. The issue of investment entry mode selection has been 
regarded as one of the most important questions that all investors need to answer during 
decision making process. Study of FDI entry mode selection, therefore, is of great 
significance for Chinese state enterprise entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
With a combination of qualitative method and SWOT analysis, this paper attempts to 
conduct a systematic study on potential FDI entry mode influencing factors from two 
perspectives: Chinese state-owned enterprises as ordinary firms and as special 
government enterprises. It aims at building a macro-level framework of FDI entry mode 
selection for China’s state-owned enterprises investing in EU and providing theoretical 
solutions in optimum entry mode selection for their decision makers. 
 
Major findings of the paper are as follows: Chinese state-owned enterprises in 
machinery, textile, light industry and electric appliance sectors should take 
wholly-owned Greenfield or partly-owned Greenfield investment when entering EU 
market; Technology, innovation, and brand effect oriented Chinese government 
enterprises are advised to go under M&A; Chinese state enterprises with the aim of 
access to foreign natural resource reserves could be most benefited from partly-owned 
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M&A entry mode; Chinese state-owned enterprises with more EU investment 
experience are in advantageous positions in employing Greenfield; Chinese state-owned 
enterprises with globalisation development strategies are recommended to employ 
wholly-owned Greenfield while Chinese state firms with localization strategies would 
be advised to use partly-owned M&A; Chinese state-owned enterprises with purposes to 
gain access to Western European high-tech clusters should adopt M&A; other 
state-owned enterprises with gradual expansion strategy should go Greenfield in EU 
emerging markets. 
 
Key Words: FDI entry mode, Chinese State-owned Enterprise, Greenfield, Merger 
and Acquisition, Framework Build-up 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Research Background 
 
Along with the deepening of globalization, the entire world sees an unprecedented 
booming expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI has become a crucial 
factor for the strategic development of enterprises all over the world. In the recent 30 
years, many Chinese enterprises have started to realize the importance of international 
markets and foreign investment opportunities. In the meantime, the increasing FDI has 
also enabled Chinese enterprises to further internationalize themselves and consequently 
they start to participate in overseas investment operations. The most important 
economic integration in the world, European Union, is now beginning to attract the 
attention of Chinese investors. 
 
According to the “2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment”, which is issued jointly by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, National 
Bureau of Statistics, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), by the end 
of 2009, 12,000 Chinese enterprises have engaged in investment projects in over 13,000 
foreign firms in 177 countries around the globe. The net outflow of Chinese FDI is 245, 
75 billion US dollars, and the total value of overseas assets has gone beyond 1 trillion 
dollars. 
 
As is shown in Table 1-1, the proportion of China’s FDI (non-financial) to EU is not 
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high in the total amount. But we could still see a general trend of upward growth. 
 
 
Table 1-1 Non-financial direct investment of China, net amount (Billion USD). 
2004-2009 
 FDI Flow FDI Stock 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China’s 
Total FDI 
5.5 12.3 17.6 26.5 55.9 56.5 44.8 57.2 75.0 120.0 184.0 245.8 
China’s 
FDI to EU 
0.16 0.40 0.60 1.54 0.88 2.97 0.68 1.27 2.27 4.46 5.13 6.28 
Source: 2004-2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
This paper takes European Union as the study target market for China’s FDI operations. 
Currently EU has 27 member states. The term new EU member states used in this paper 
refers to countries which joined EU in the EU enlargement in 2004 and after, namely 
Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania. The term old EU member states used in this paper refers to 
countries which are already members of EU before 2004 enlargement, including Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. Statistics of recent years indicates that 
China’s FDI to EU mainly concentrate in European traditional powers, such as Germany, 
UK and France. 
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Source: 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
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In 2009, the inflow FDI of Luxembourg reached 88 billion Euros, accounting for 40% of the EU member 
statestotal FDI inflow of the year. UK and France follow behind with shares of 15% and 5% respectively. 
The lion share of Luxembourg owes to its important role as a financial intermediary in international 
investment transactions.1
                                                          
1 Source: Eurostat, Statistical Office of the European Commission 
 
 
 
From chart 1-2 and 1-3, we could see that China’s FDI to Europe still concentrates 
mainly in traditional European powers. Old EU members account for the majority in 
both China’s FDI flows (9 out of 10) and stocks (9 out of 10) rankings. Moreover, an 
overlapping part, which consists of seven countries (Luxembourg, UK, Germany, 
Netherlands, France,Spain, and Italy), can be easily noticed. On the contrary, China’s 
investment toward new EU members still remains at the beginning stage. Although the 
amount of overall investment in Czech hasreached 15 million US dollars, the size of 
FDI to other new EU members does not see a significant growth. New EU members 
will sooner or later become a target region of great potential and opportunities for 
Chinese investors. 
 
From the current statistics, China’s FDI in EU has a strong feature of industry 
concentration but with a trend of becoming diverse. Trade and other commercial service, 
transportation, and finance are China’s three investment focuses in EU. Some 
investment projects also take place in other industries like mining industry, high-tech 
industry, and process manufacturing industry. At present, although FDI from China has 
not been involved in industries with far ranges, those industries mentioned above turned 
out to be wise choices where advantages of enterprises of both host country and China 
are closely combined together. 
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Source: 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
About the composition of the investors, as is shown in chart 1-4, we could clearly see 
that state-owned enterprises are the main body of the investors in the case of China, 
which accounts for 69.2% of the entire amount of FDI stocks. For instance, in the 
transportation industry, Chinese state-owned enterprises, like China Ocean Shipping 
Company (COSCO), China Shipping Company, China National Aviation Holding 
Company (CNAH) and etc., have not only established branches and wholly owned 
subsidiaries in Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Austria and Netherlands, but also begun to 
seek for opportunities of merger with companies in the host country. If we look at the 
financial sector, major investors are composed of state-owned commercial banks and 
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insurance companies. All of the four major Chinese commercial banks (Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank, 
Bank of China) have investments in EU. 
 
 
1.2  Definition of Chinese state-owned enterprise 
 
There is no one single definition for Chinese state-owned enterprise. As for the 
classification of SOEs, ‘state-owned enterprises’ and ‘state-owned and state-holding 
enterprises’ have been used in official statistics2
The term “state-owned enterprises” refers to business entities established by central and 
local governments, and whose supervisory officials are from the government. Most 
importantly, this definition of ‘state-owned enterprises’ includes only wholly 
state-funded firms
. 
 
3
In this paper, the term ‘Chinese state-owned enterprise’ (CSOE) refers to China’s 
‘state-owned and state-holding enterprises’. Other forms of expression, like 
government-owned enterprise, government-controlled enterprise and state enterprise, all 
. 
 
The term ‘state-owned and state-holding enterprises’,which came into use since the 
mid-1990s, consists of state-owned enterprises plus state-holding enterprises. 
State-owned enterprises are, as aforementioned, wholly state-funded firms and the 
definition of ‘state-holding enterprises’ is that they are firms whose majority shares are 
held by government. This broad and clear definition of SOEs is used and published by 
the China Statistical Yearbook, includes all state-owned and state-holding companies. 
 
                                                          
2 State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence, OECD Working Group Privatisation and 
Corporate Governance of State Owned Assets, 26 January 2009 
3 Statistics are majorly distributed by the Chinese Ministry of Finance in publications such as the Finance 
Yearbook of China. 
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share the same meaning with Chinese state-owned enterprise. 
 
 
1.3  Aim of Research 
 
This paper attempts to conduct a systematic study on potential FDI entry mode 
influencing factors from two perspectives: Chinese state-owned enterprises as ordinary 
firms and as special government enterprises. It aims at building a macro-level 
framework of FDI entry mode selection for China’s state-owned enterprises investing in 
EU and providing theoretical solutions in optimum entry mode selection for their 
decision makers. Qualitative approach and SWOT analysis will be employed. The 
framework would potential benefit decision makers of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
as it provides insights and suggestions on their choice of optimum FDI entry mode 
combinations, as well as potential threats these entrepreneurs may be faced with. 
 
In order to achieve the object of the paper, several tasks will need to be accomplished. 
These tasks are as follows: 
 
1. Review existing literature on FDI entry mode research from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. 
2. Analyze theoretical frameworks of entry mode selection study approaches and 
theories involved. Find theoretical support in help building the framework. 
3. Study influencing factors of FDI entry mode selection from theoretical perspective, 
Chinese state-enterprises as ordinary firms. 
4. Investigate special characteristics of Chinese state-owned enterprises and the 
potential influencing contributors, using SWOT, Chinese state-enterprises as special 
government-controlled enterprises. 
5. Investigate the current feature of entry modes used 
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6. Integrate all previous findings and build the framework 
7. Provide China’s state-owned enterprises with appropriate suggestions for choosing 
the right entry mode in accordance with each of their different investment motivations 
characteristics. 
8. Conduct case studies using the framework 
 
 
1.4  Significance of Research 
 
From the intuitional observation and analysis on the statistics above, we could see that 
FDI of Chinese state-owned enterprises is enjoying a vigorous growth. In China, 
state-owned enterprises play a crucial role in the economic development. Besides the 
internal economic activities, this can also be reflected from external investment plans. 
According to “2008 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment”, 
Chinese state-owned enterprises have been holding the largest share in FDI stocks in the 
recent years. Many of these state-owned enterprises, especially big firms like China 
Ocean Shipping Company and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 
have provided companies of other forms rich overseas investment experience from their 
former successful FDI activities. Since the state-owned enterprises are a special group 
which are different from other investing bodies, it will be of much significance if we 
could study how investment entry mode selection can made during their decision 
making progress, how to solve realistic problems in order to maintain competitive on 
the international level. 
 
At present, compared with the continuously growing total amount of FDI, Chinese 
investment into EU does not seem to be at a vantage point. But investing in EU is 
becoming a trend and European markets possess advantages in attracting more and more 
inflow investment. First of all, EU is one of the regions which hold the world’s largest 
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FDI stocks. The fact of lacking enough investment in this region has already realized by 
Chinese authorities. In addition, EU is the third biggest trade partner of China. The 
effect of EU enlargement in the new century can be told not merely from its political 
power-up, but much more from the expansion of its market volume. Well-functioned 
investment policies and laws, together with its excellent infrastructure and cultural 
diversity, will definitely offer Chinese firms convincing reasons for prospective 
investment chances. Thirdly, the high level of advanced technologies and management 
strategies from the developed countries in EU would surely catch the attention of 
Chinese firms which are growing rapidly and in search of methods for further growth. 
Last but not the least, many EU countries are also looking for cooperation opportunities 
with Chinese firms. New policies are made in order to bring in more FDI from China. 
For example, France and China offered each other over 90 overseas investment projects 
which secured mutual benefits. All these reasons listed above are in support of the 
assertion that Chinese state-owned enterprises will no doubt continually enlarge their 
future FDI in EU. 
 
Studies on FDI of Chinese state-owned enterprises in EU, therefore, are of great 
practical significance. Rational development strategies are prerequisites for the entry of 
European market. In the study of overseas investment strategies, the choice of entry 
mode is one that could be decisive to the success of FDI projects. From the investment 
establishment process aspect, modes of FDI can be categorized as new business 
investment and cross-border merger and acquisition; from the overseas enterprise stock 
composition aspect, modes of FDI can be divided into joint venture and wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise. Different modes of investments differ in resource input, 
control level, and risk responsibility, and therefore the returns and output are various as 
well. The mode of investment does not solely affect an enterprise’s management 
strategy and control over its overseas subsidiary, but also its own potential risk and 
performance through the investment. There are some former cases that stress the 
12 
 
importance of investment mode selection. Due to inappropriate investment mode 
selected, some investment projects brought in by Chinese firms eventually failed. In all, 
to ensure the state-owned enterprises could make the right choice at the beginning of 
their investment, we need to carefully think about the best strategy for investment mode. 
 
This paper takes China’s state-owned enterprises as research target and set the main 
focus, or investment location, on EU member states. 
 
 
1.5  Research Structure 
 
The research structure is illustrated in Chart 1-5 (See Appendix) 
 
The first chapter raises the research question about Chinese state-owned enterprise FDI 
to EU entry mode selection and significance of the study. The next chapter will be 
reviewing existing literature from both European and Chinese sides. Chapter Three 
mainly discusses FDI entry mode selection related theories. Chapter Four is going to 
take CSOE as ordinary firms and examine their FDI entry mode influencing factors 
from two different advantage transfer aspects. Chapter Five mainly deals with the 
uniqueness of CSOE and employs SWOT analysis in extracting possible influencing 
elements of entry mode selection, CSOE taken as special government enterprises. In 
Chapter Six, features of current entry mode pattern will be discussed and then, with 
reference to previous theoretical preparation, the final framework of FDI entry mode 
selection will be formed. The latter part of the chapter conducts two case studies in 
providing further suggestions on choices of FDI entry mode. Chapter Seven concludes. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1  Theoretical foundation of Investment Mode Selection 
 
The theoretical foundation of FDI investment mode selection originates from the 
development of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Hymer is the pioneer in this field. In 
1960s, he 4 (1976) claims that a prerequisite of MNE establishment is the ownership of 
knowledge and skills, which can be referred to as ‘ownership advantage’. As domestic 
firms of host countries are more likely to be in a superior position of better 
understanding the local market environment, consumer behaviour, and being more 
experienced in business, foreign companies will need the ownership of unique expertise 
to offset their disadvantage of being foreign. Otherwise, MNEs would never be able to 
compete with their local opponents. Hymer’s work has begun to set up a systematic 
theoretical framework for the theories of multinational enterprises management. After 
this, Raymond Vernon (1966) introduced Product Life Cycle theory. Buckley and 
Casson5 (1976) conceptualized internalization theory. Then followed the contribution 
of Dunning’s 6
                                                          
4Hymer, S., (1976), The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Foreign 
DirectInvestment, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
5Buckley, P.J., Casson, M., (1976), The Future of the Multinational Enterprises. London: Macmillan 
6Dunning, J., (1977), Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the multinational enterprise: A Search for 
an Eclectic Approach. The International Allocation of Economic Activity, New York: Holms and Meier. 
 (1977; 1981) famous OLI paradigm. In the OLI theory, the entry mode 
of a multinational corporation is determined by three sets of advantages: O (ownership 
advantage), L (location advantage), and I (internalization advantage). Ownership 
advantage refers to multinational enterprises’ specific nature advantages, such as human 
14 
 
capital, technology and knowhow. Location advantage is arising from strategically 
investing in different locations. As resources and policies are varied from place to place, 
MNEs could potentially minimizing production and other costs by choosing wisely to 
invest in different locations. Internalization advantage arises when multinational 
enterprises decide to transfer their ownership advantages across countries but within the 
company. However, through frequent business contacts between multinationals and 
domestic firms, the technology and expertise owned by multinational companies may 
not necessarily be transferred to the host country via market business. Later, Kiyoshi 
Kojima enriched the FDI theories by using a Japanese model of multinational business 
operations. 
 
In theories of monopolistic advantage and internalization advantage, foreign direct 
investment is considered as a MNE’s mode of entry to overseas market. After Hymer, H. 
G. Johnson points out reasons why MNEs would internalize knowledge products with 
‘public’ attribute. 
 
Kogut (1988, 1991), Merlin (1992), Liang (1995) and some other scholars used the 
angle of enterprise strategies in the research of FDI entry mode selection. This theory 
emphasizes the minimization of production and transactional costs when other 
conditions and enterprise strategy are held. 
 
 
2.2  Literature Review on Investment Mode Selection 
 
2.2.1  Empirical Studies on Investment Mode Selection 
 
Based on different theoretical frameworks, researchers of many countries have carried 
out empirical studies to test the findings and conclusions of theories about FDI entry 
15 
 
mode selection, which diversified the theory of FDI. 
 
On the ownership structure aspect, researchers mainly take enterprise costs, product life 
cycle of foreign direct investment, and cultural difference as threads of research. The 
work of Leung 7
The study of Gomers Cassers
 (Leung, 1997) shows that the life span of joint ventures is on average 
shorter than that of wholly owned firm. ‘An international joint venture is formed when 
the partners contribute different benefits to the venture. Each party learns from the 
others through the joint venture. However, the literature suggests that joint ventures are 
unstable. So it is hypothesized that, on average, an international joint venture will have 
a shorter duration than a foreign wholly-owned subsidiary.’ In the long term view, 
MNEs have comparatively adequate time in adapting the local business environment 
and accumulating operational experience, which are essential assets in overcoming 
cultural difference disadvantage. Therefore, transform from partly owned venture to 
wholly owned firm is considered to be strategic choices in most cases.  
 
Caves and Mehra (1986) take the number of countries involved in MNEs’ overseas 
operation as a measurement for their overseas operational experience, and have arrived 
at the similar results.  
 
8
                                                          
7 Leung, W. F., (1997), The Duration of International Joint Ventures and Foreign Wholly Owned 
Subsidiaries. Applied Economics. (29): 1255-1269. 
8 Casseres, B. G., (1989), Ownership Structures of Foreign Subsidiaries. Theory and Evidence. Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization. (11): 1-25. 
 (1989) shows that ‘MNEs are found 10 prefer a joint 
venture with a host-country firm over a wholly owned subsidiary when: (1) the 
capabilities of the local firm complement those of the MNE; (2) the contributions of 
both firms are costlier to transfer contractually than through ownership channels, and 
(3) costs due to shirking by partners and conflicts between them do not outweigh the 
benefits or joint ownership. (Gomers Cassers, 1989)’ 
16 
 
 
On the perspective of overseas firm establishment process, important clues are 
enterprise advantage, characteristics of industry involved, R&D, etc. Anderson and 
Svensson believe that the unique advantages of a company could bias the preference 
between M&A and Greenfield investment forms. 
 
Kluas Myer and Saul Estrin analyzed the difference of M&A and Greenfield, based on 
transactional costs theory. 
 
Stefano Rossi and Paolo F. Volpin conducted a thorough study on laws and regulations 
of various countries and their influence to M&A investment. According to their 
observation, larger scales of M&A are more likely to be detected in countries with better 
functioning accountant and shareholder rights protection system. Findings of studies by 
Agarwal and Ramaswami, Kim and Huang (1992); Buckly and Casson (1996); Hennart 
and Reddy (1997) are all in support of the inference that an MNE would employ M&A 
mode of entry when MNEs become mature in their overall scale. The research on 
investment behaviour of MNEs of pharmaceutical and electronic appliance industries by 
Kuemmerle and on motivation of MNEs’ R&D centre based in the US by Florida (1997) 
both indicate that the motives of these institutes’ engaging in FDI are mainly to obtain 
advanced technology from the target market, in order to strengthen their market 
leadership technologically. ‘…the globalization of innovation is driven in large measure 
by technology factors. Of particular importance is the objective of firms to secure 
access to scientific and technical human capital. (Florida, 1997)’ 
 
Kuemmerle (1999) based his research on an econometric analysis of 136 laboratory 
investments and the findings indicate that ‘…relative market size and relative strength 
of a country's science base determine whether FDI in research and development is 
carried out in order to exploit existing firm-specific advantages, or in order to build up 
17 
 
new firm-specific advantages. This holds true in similar form for Japanese, European 
and U.S. firms and across the two industries. (Kuemmerle, 1999)’ 
 
Especially for MNEs of technology intensive industries like pharmaceutical and 
telecommunication industries, establishing of overseas R&D centre is a common 
practice ever since 1990s and will last for a long time.  
 
 
2.2.2  Existing Literature Review on Chinese Firm FDI Entry Mode Selection 
 
About ownership structure, Lingzhen Yao and Daxie Yang (2003) targeted the efficiency 
of joint ventures and found that joint ventures are in general faced with a kind of costs 
that can be understand as loss of efficiency. Since joint ventures are lower in efficiency, 
they will sooner or later have to decide whether to transform into wholly subsidiaries. 
Then Yao and Yang analyzed the case of MNEs entering Chinese markets, with a 
reference to the general practice of MNE market entry decisions. They also presented 
suggestions for Chinese firms which are going to participate in international investment 
activities. Guoshun Wang and Dengfang Zheng (2006) employed a time series data set 
and conducted a study on the importance of factors which influence investment mode of 
entry selection. The significance of chosen factors’ influence is changing various during 
different stages of the investment process. They tested four hypothesises and gave out 
suggestions for investors during their decision making process at different time points. 
‘The main conclusions are as follows. First, the FDI entry mode choice is influenced by 
the interaction between firm-specific, strategic, environmental and transaction-specific 
variables. Since different variables suggest different entry modes, it is of critical 
importance that management decision-makers consider the relative weight of the 
firm-specific, strategic, environmental and transaction-specific variables when selecting 
a mode of entry. Second, it is found that asset-specific factors, psychic distance, 
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knowledge tacitness, location risk and FDI policy factors are the primary factors of FDI 
entry mode choice in China, and the degree of their impact on FDI entry mode choice 
are on the increase accordingly.’ (Guoshun Wang and Dengfang Zheng, 2006) 
 
Regarding overseas subsidiary establishment modes, Zhanqi Yao proposed a simplified 
model for enterprises entering international markets. The model mainly deals with the 
question when and under what conditions an MNE would select Greenfield or M&A 
investment mode. The paper also discussed policy and regulation issue about FDI. It 
argues ‘argues that the host country government s should balance t he positive effect s 
and negative effects when it establishes it s policies to regulate the direct investment of 
multinational enterprises. Finally, it analyzes the foreign direct investment of 
multinational enterprises that happens in China and put s forward the policy tropism. 
(Yao, 2006)’ 
 
Langnan Chen, Ruming Hong, Mianbi Xie (2005) carried on the study over FDI entry 
mode selection with their work ‘Entry Methods of Serving Foreign Markets for Chinese 
MNCs’. They first analyzed advantages and disadvantages of various investment entry 
modes and summarized foreign countries’ former experience of entry mode selection 
between Greenfield and M&A, wholly owned and partly owned forms, and their 
influencing factors. Then they applied the findings from their previous analysis to 
Chinese investing firms who are seeking for international projects and proposed some 
advices. ‘Acquisition and partially owned subsidiaries for know-how oriented FDI in 
developing countries; newly established subsidiaries and partially owned subsidiaries 
for product-transfer oriented FDI in developing countries; and partially owned 
subsidiaries for resource oriented FDI. (Chen, Hong, Xie, 2005)’ 
 
Through a respective differentiation analysis combined with quantitative method and 
Tobin’s Q theory, Xiaohong Li (2006) argued that M&A has gradually become a crucial 
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way for enterprises to take part in international investment operations. 
 
In the existing literature on studies of entry mode choice influencing factor, apart from 
the contributing factors introduced by Langnan Chen and his colleagues, some other 
factors were also raised and tested by Chinese researchers. With a reference to 
knowledge factor, Yuanxu Li and Ying Zhou (2006) argued that level of tacitness of 
enterprise knowledge (KM) is an important factor in deciding which FDI mode of entry 
a firm would use, and knowledge transfer capacity is the decisive factor. Huiming Cai 
(2006) forwarded the research over FDI entry mode selection factors in the perspective 
of how to fortify the efficiency of transferring and utilizing firm specific advantages. 
After reviewing and summarizing theories about foreign direct investment, he drew the 
conclusion that three factors turn out to have contributing effect in deciding FDI entry 
mode, including firm specific advantage resource transfer starting point factor, transfer 
ending point factor and enterprise strategy factor. 
 
In addition, Li Kong (2006) investigated the alternation of FDI entry modes and pointed 
out the trend of Greenfield substituted by M&A. The focus of the paper basically deals 
with the question ‘…why transnational M&A becomes the most way of FDI. With the 
development of Chinese economy, transnational M&A will become the most way of the 
FDI. In the text, we find the trend and must take measures to make M&A be helpful to 
China. (Kong, 2006)’ 
 
Ping Deng (2007) used strategic asset-seeking approach and case study evidence in 
examining the rationale of Chinese companies outward FDI in acquiring natural 
resources. His work argued that asset-seeking FDI is widely used by Chinese firms in 
order to gain access to foreign strategic resource reserves in developed countries. 
 
Qiang Wu (2006) studied new FDI entry modes adopted by Chinese firms investing 
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abroad and further introduced high-tech industrial park as a new method. 
 
 
2.2.3  Literature on Studies of Chinese Investing Firms in EU 
 
For the reason that Chinese firms’ investment in EU does not account for a large 
proportion in China’s entire FDI amount, research and studies about Chinese firms 
investing in EU seem to be not quite thorough. Tong Lu (2000) examined China owned 
firms in UK and discussed seven factors of these subsidiaries that influence the 
internationalization of Chinese state-owned firms, including ownership structure, 
investment motivation, management strategy, competition advantage, mode of entry, 
level of management, process of acquiring know-how. Bo Xu (2001) claimed that 
Chinese firms already have conditions and capability to invest in Western European 
countries and further proofed the argument by analyzing the motivation of Chinese 
enterprises investment operations in Europe. Liangwei Zhang (2002) conducted an 
analysis of investment status of China and EU under the background of their bilateral 
operation. 
 
 
2.3  Conclusion on Existing Literature Review 
 
As is shown in the literature review, the development of FDI mode theories are closely 
linked with economic growth. At the initial stage of foreign direct investment 
development, most large-scale investing bodies were enterprises from developed 
countries. They were dominant powers in their industries. So the theory of monopolistic 
advantage seemed to be quite satisfying in explaining enterprise growth and investment 
activities. As the world economy developed, however, developing countries got more 
and more actively involved in investing in foreign countries. Monopolistic advantage 
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theory could no longer provide sufficient and convincing answers in explaining new 
investment phenomena and trend. Then the eclectic theory of international production 
and the theory of transactional cost were introduced. With the rapid pace of 
globalization in the second half of 20th century, outward investment to foreign countries 
became so important that it is now serving as an economic tool for the whole world’s 
economic accumulation. Thereafter, economists started to pay special attention on the 
factors that influences the decision making process of FDI. And the mode of foreign 
direct investment became a field in the studies of FDI. From the early joint venture and 
wholly owned enterprise forms to new business investment and cross-border merger and 
acquisition, more and more scholars take in various investment modes in their 
qualitative and quantitative researches. 
 
But we should also notice that deficiency still exists in the current theoretical 
framework. If we take a look at the overall development progress of these investment 
theories, we could see that they are not totally separate but complementary with each 
other. As these theories themselves are developing and being amended, explanations on 
the basis of them are coming to fit the real economic practice more than ever. 
Monopolistic advantage theory, internalization theory and the early eclectic theory of 
international production all take FDI as a market entry method that is different from the 
traditional method ‘export, permission to do business’. In the following theory of 
transactional cost, FDI mode of entry comes to be a target for analysis. The issue of 
overseas subsidiary ownership is also an important part that is addressed in the theory. 
But the theories mentioned above seem to deal with only wholly owned enterprises. The 
question how to effectively select FDI mode of entry remains untouched. Based on 
present theories, this paper will attempt to analyze mainly on entry modes of Greenfield, 
M&A, wholly owned and joint venture. 
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CHAPTER THREE: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ENTRY MODE 
THEORIES 
 
 
Entry mode is the reflection of a firm’s preference over its asset and risk control, and 
level of integration during the international expansion process. In order to more 
precisely grasp factors influencing entry mode selection and impacts to enterprises, we 
will need to conduct comparison studies of characteristics of different entry modes. 
Over the recent 30 years, the question how to make appropriate choices over entry mode 
has been an issue that is under attention and debate. Several theoretical frameworks and 
analyzing approaches are employed by economists over the world. This chapter will 
first review the classical theories related to FDI entry mode study and then conduct a 
comparison analysis between major forms of investment entry modes, Greenfield and 
M&A, wholly-owned firm and joint venture. 
 
 
3.1  Review of Foreign Direct Investment Entry Mode Related Theories 
 
Theories of FDI entry mode selection are mainly developed in three different 
approaches.  
 
The first approach is Market Imperfection and Market Failure paradigm raised during 
1960s and 1970s. Key theories of it are Transactional Cost theory, Internalization theory, 
and Eclectic theory. Main contributors of this theory are Backley and Casson (1976, 
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1998), Anderson and Catignon (1986), Dunning (1988, 2000), Kim and Hwang (I992). 
 
Researchers also take Behavioural paradigm as another approach in the study of FDI 
entry mode selection. In this approach, Internationalization is one of the most important 
theories. Johanson and Wiedersheim (1975, 1993), Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990) 
are representatives among scholars in this field. 
 
The Resource-based View (RBV) paradigm as the third approach becomes widely 
accepted during 1990s. The three major theories involved in this approach are 
Resource-based Firm theory, Core Competency theory, Dynamic Capability theory, 
which are together known as Orgnization Capability theory. Representative researchers 
in this field are Wernerfelt (1984), Kogut and Singh (1988), Perteraf (1993), Madhok 
(1997, 2002), Teece. et a1.(1997). 
 
Theories of these three approaches offer explanations to the behaviour and mechanism 
of foreign market entry mode selection from cost, efficiency and process dimensions 
respectively, and provide fruitful research findings. The following will be a brief review 
and comment on the representative theories of these three approaches. 
 
 
3.1.1  Transactional Cost Theory and Internalization Theory 
 
Transactional Cost theory and Internalization theory both argue that when transferring 
peculiar or exclusively owned knowledge and technology abroad, enterprises are able to 
lower transactional costs by utilizing their internal organization structure and 
information network rather than the external market. 
 
“In economics and related disciplines, a transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an 
24 
 
economic exchange”. The idea of Transactional Cost theory was first introduced in 
Coase’ paper ‘The Nature of the Firm’ in 1937, and later advanced by Williamson, 
Backley and Casson etc. In Williamson’s work, he discussed the essence, origin, 
development of modern enterprises and corporate structure. Transactional Cost theory 
holds that choice of entry mode is actually a choice of management structure or level of 
control, and the optimum entry mode should arise from the trade-off between 
production costs and returns. Although higher level of control are helpful in reducing 
agents’ opportunism, it asks for more resource input and higher risk responsibility at the 
same time; on the contrary, under lower level of control, parent companies are exposed 
to lower level of input requirement and risk, but agents’ opportunism cannot be 
overcome. According to the theory of transactional cost, a company should consider the 
cost incurred during a transaction before it is done. Generally laws of the host country, 
familiarity with the host country, and cultural difference may all potentially influence 
entry mode selection through transaction costs. Internalization theory has similarities 
with Transactional Cost theory in its argumentation. 
 
This theory well explains questions aroused during organization management process of 
firms as contract entities and the economic mechanism behind it. Being the logic 
starting point of Internalization theory, it also clearly illustrates the reason why many 
MNEs choose internalization as the organizational structure during their overseas 
expansion process. But in the recent years, some scholars claim that using Transactional 
Cost theory in the study of entry mode has its shortcomings: 
1. Transactional Cost theory treats transaction as an independent analysis unit and, 
therefore, is static. It has ignored the dynamic examination of knowledge creation and 
transfer efficiency intra- and inter-organizations. 
2. The minimum of transaction costs may not necessarily brings the outcome of higher 
returns or maximum of competitive advantages. The fundamental goal of enterprises as 
production entities is to maximize enterprise value. 
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3. It could not provide solid explanations, as it did to internalization, towards the 
mechanism of joint ventures. 
 
 
3.1.2  Eclectic Theory 
 
Eclectic theory basically holds that the success of foreign direct investment is not only 
decided by the presence of enterprises’ expertise knowledge and technology, but also the 
presence of infrastructure in the host country, with which MNEs are able to make their 
specialized knowledge applicable. And it is internalization capability of the enterprise 
that further decides whetherboth expertise and infrastructure conditions could be met. 
 
Eclectic theory is developed on the basis of John Dunning’s (1977; 1981) OLI paradigm. 
In the OLI theory, the entry mode of a multinational corporation is determined by a set 
of three advantages: O (ownership advantage), L (location advantage), and I 
(internalization advantage). Ownership advantage refers to multinational enterprises’ 
specific nature advantages, such as human capital, technology and knowhow. Location 
advantage is arising from strategically investing in different locations. As resources and 
policies are varied from place to place, MNEs could potentially minimizing production 
and other costs by choosing wisely to invest in different locations. Internalization 
advantage arises when multinational enterprises decide to transfer their ownership 
advantages across countries but within the company. It emphasizes comprehensive 
analysis when studying entry mode selection as the final decision of entry mode derives 
from multiple influencing factors. These factors mainly include knowledge and 
knowhow of an enterprise, policies and infrastructure of the host country, value of the 
transferrable knowledge and the company’s transfer capability, cultural difference, etc. 
 
Kim and Hwang (1992) take firms’ strategic construct as an endogenous variable into 
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the framework of eclectic theory. Three underlying constructs are found to be influential 
to the selection of entry mode: global concentration, global synergy, and global strategic 
motivation.  
 
There are two major differences between Dunning’s and Kim and Hwang’s theories.  
1. Kim and Hwang focus on single industry while Dunning attempts to explain the 
reasons for all MNEs going into overseas investment behaviour. 
2. Kim and Hwang assume that firm’s competitive advantages are temporary; but in 
Dunning’s theory, firm’s competitive advantages are monopolistic. 
But neither of the two gives clear attention to firm’s resource allocation and capability 
build-up process. 
 
 
3.1.3  Internationalization Theory 
 
Internationalization (Strategy) theory is introduced and brought forward by some 
Swedish and Danish scholars. One of its exponentials is Leif Melin (Melin, 1992). 
Internationalization theory believes that in overseas expansion process, MNEs will be 
inevitably exposed to challenges from cultural, political, and market mechanism aspects. 
The essence of go investing abroad lies in its significance of being a part of market 
strategy and competition strategy. The purpose of foreign direct investment is to diverse 
risks, promote enterprise reputation, and coordinate company strategies. It could be 
regarded as a way of strategic defence in order not to let the competition position 
weakened, rather than ways of merely achieving profits or gaining access to special 
resources. To avoid risks from these aspects, MNEs are very likely to use progressive 
strategy in entering the target market. 
 
Internationalization theory takes entry mode selection as a strategy process study. It 
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reveals the importance of accumulated overseas management experience and knowledge 
during entry mode choice decision making process. As the accumulation of experience 
and knowledge deepen, entry mode of larger scale resource commitment, control and 
risk level will be gradually instead of lower level of market entry. After the early 
exporting business mode, enterprises would gain easier access to technology permission, 
and eventually establish wholly owned or form partly owned subsidiary firms in the 
host country. 
 
But Internationalization theory, unlike the later introduced Organization Capability 
theory which emphasizes firm internal issues of resource and capability structure, 
stresses a lot on external influencing factors of the firm, or in other words, the 
psychological distance between the parent country and the host country. It mainly deals 
with uncertainty and risks caused by foreign unfamiliarity (Johanson and Vahlne, 2001). 
In spite of its shortcomings, Internationalization theory still provides us with good 
reference when studying entry mode and its time-related process characteristics. 
 
 
3.1.4  Organization Capability Theory 
 
Organization Capability theory is a theory about forming, maintaining and reinforcing 
enterprise competition advantages. It mainly includes three major theories: 
Resource-based Firm theory, Core Competency theory, and Dynamic Capability theory. 
According to Organization Capability theory, the aim of entry mode selection strategies 
should be seeking for a combination of appropriate entry mode and the company’s 
long-term development objective, rather than merely minimizing short-term costs. 
MNEs keep updating improving their capability structure through selecting a series of 
endogenous entry modes, and further obtain a comparatively stable organizational 
operational mode in order to maintain adjust production and management procedure and 
28 
 
achieve higher efficiency. Collaborating with other firms, though maybe exposed to 
higher costs, could broaden firms’ vision and enhance their overall capability and 
bestow them with huge competition advantages and returns. 
 
Under Organization Capability theory, parameters that may influence choice of entry 
mode are: knowledge transfer experience, managerial skills, international capability, 
social distance, resource commonality (Madhok, 1998). 
 
The focus of Organization Capability theory lies in enterprises’ internal resource 
allocation mode, organizational structure, and knowledge stimulus effect on obtaining 
firm growth and market competition advantage. Unlike static Transactional Cost theory, 
it supports the argument that the choice of entry mode should be in accordance with 
companies’ long-term strategic needs rather than short-term costs and returns. Selection 
of entry mode is decided by not only Transaction Cost theory and Eclectic theory, but 
also firms’ internal characteristics of resource and capability. 
 
 
3.2  Comparative Analysis of Major Foreign Direct Investment Entry Modes 
 
There are basically two major questions that need to be answered before a company 
going to invest in foreign countries: How and in what form of investment and 
ownership mode the new company shall be established. In other words, the board of the 
company need to make decisions on: 
 
1. choice of investment mode: whether to create a new venture (Greenfield Investment) 
or merge/acquire a foreign company (Merger and Acquisition) 
 
2. choice of ownership mode: who would be the new venture’s owner(s), partly owned 
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venture (joint venture) or wholly owned subsidiary. 
 
Therefore, in general, a candidate result of FDI entry mode selection should be a 
combination of the final decision of investment and ownership modes. This means that 
an FDI mode should fall into one of the following four types: partly owned Greenfield 
investment, wholly owned Greenfield investment, partly owned merger and acquisition, 
or wholly owned merger and acquisition.9
                                                          
9 Other minor FDI modes of entry like Brownfield will not be discussed in the paper. 
 
 
The selection of foreign direct investment mode is one of the most pivotal decisions that 
are going to be made during the process of investing abroad. Appropriate mode of FDI 
must be based on thorough observation and analysis of the host country’s resource stock 
capacity, economic situation, investment policyfriendiness and other conditions. The 
results of the analysis, combined with proper investment motivation, would eventually 
form the mode of FDI the company would use to enter the target market. Wise choice of 
FDI entry mode marks the key to the success of an overseas investment operation and 
will maximize returns from the investment. Each mode has its own applicable range and 
merit. When a company is making decisions on the choice of FDI entry mode, a large 
set of factors or variables (motivation, target market qualifications, parent company’s 
investment capabilities, international finance market situation, etc.) would be taken into 
account. 
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3.2.1   Comparative Analysis of Greenfield and M&A Investment 
 
 
Greenfield 
 
“A Greenfield Investment is the investment in a manufacturing, office, or other physical 
company-related structure or group of structures in an area where no previous facilities 
exist”10
“Merger and Acquisition (M&A) refers to the aspect of corporate strategy, corporate 
finance and management dealing with the buying, selling and combining of different 
companies that can aid, finance, or help a growing company in a given industry grow 
rapidly without having to create another business entity”
. The parent company usually creates a brand new subsidiary and holds its 
ownership. Greenfield investment is one of the traditional forms of investment and used 
to be taken by most MNEs during 1980s. In the recent years, as the M&A form of 
investment is gaining popularity, the amount of Greenfield investment in international 
FDI has reduced. But it remains one of the most practical investment mode. 
 
 
M&A 
 
11
                                                          
10 Broadcom. "802.11n: Next-Generation Wireless LAN Technology White Paper" 
11 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mergers_and_acquisitions 
. It is straightforward that 
Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition has two forms: Cross-Border Merger and Cross 
Border Acquisition. When cross-border merger takes place, the assets and management 
of two different companies in different countries combine together and form a new 
company. In cross-border acquisition, the acquiree company’s control of its asset and 
management shift to another foreign business entity, while the corporation legal 
representative of the acquiring company (acquirer company) remains the same. 
Generally, the two words merger and acquisition can be used together as it is quite 
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common that cross-border acquisition takes place during merger activities. 
 
As a kind of complicated business operation behaviour, according to the industry 
relationship between the acquirer and acquiree companies, Merger and Acquisition 
could also be dived into three categories: horizontal integration, vertical integration and 
diversified conglomerate integration. 
 
 
(1) Horizontal Integration 
 
Horizontal integration refers to the merger or acquisition between two companies which 
produce or sell similar products or alternatives. The aim of horizontal integration seeks 
for collaborative effect. With the two companies joining together, asset of the new 
company will become the add-up of the two companies. Thus, the stronger power 
enables the company to have more chances of being monopoly and enhances its 
competitiveness in the international market in order to gain a larger market share. 
Besides, companies choose horizontal integration type for merger do not have to face a 
high risk. It is easier for the two merging companies, which have much in common in 
their products, business operations, and scales, to come to agreement for merger and 
acquisition. Horizontal integration is more likely to bring in economies of scale effect 
and internalization. This will further result in an increase in profits. Typical sectors 
where horizontal integration takes places in are pharmacy industry, automobile industry, 
petroleum industry, and part of service sector. 
 
 
(2) Vertical Integration 
 
Vertical integration incurs when a company is merging, acquiring or being acquired 
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with/by an upstream or downstream company. Vertical integration usually strengthens a 
company’s production and sales ability by occupying related channels along the 
production or sales stream. It could effectively reduce uncertainty of upstream and 
downstream collaboration and lower transactional costs. At the same time it expands the 
source of raw materials for production and distribution channels fro products. Because 
the two merging companies are in the same line (but different stages) for producing the 
same goods, they are familiar with each other’s business. New firms established from 
vertical integration usually turn out to be stable and functioning well with internal 
collaboration. Good examples are parts makers and their clients, such as electronic 
products assemblers and automobile producers.  
 
 
(3) Diversified Conglomerate Integration 
 
Diversified conglomerate integration is the combination of horizontal and vertical 
integration with at least two different companies. The goal of diversified conglomerate 
pmerger is to minimize investment risks and deepen economies of scale effect. The idea 
of diversified investment is often adopted by MNEs as a strategy for international 
expansion. As is possesses the advantages of both horizontal and vertical integration, 
the company using this strategy would have much more control power in competing 
with its opponents. Compared with the previous two investment strategies, a feature of 
diversified conglomerate integration is that it is sometimes covert and hard to be 
noticed. 
 
 
Comparison of Greenfield and M&A Investment 
 
Besides the different way of forming a new venture or subsidiary, Cross-border 
33 
 
Greenfield and Merger and Acquisition also have dissimilarities in the investment 
process, costs and returns, and the influence to the host country, as is shown in Table 
3-1 in Appendix. 
 
 
(1) Investment Process 
 
1. Investment Target Industry Selection 
 
It is straightforward to understand that Greenfield investment has the largest range for 
application. It is applicable to nearly all industries. Theoretically, M&A may also 
happen in all the industries. But in reality, M&A takes place mainly in industries which 
have capital and technology concentration and high entry and exit barriers. In these 
industries, investors would have quick benefits from M&A. By engaging in M&A, they 
could weaken or remove competitors immediately. Huge amount of research and 
development fund could be equally distributed or supplied by several partner ventures 
together. Economies of scale effect would more easily to come to real in purchase, 
production and sales stages. The reason for this is that by merging or acquiring another 
company in the target market, the parent company could take quick reactions toward 
operations of their opponents or potential competitors. For instance, lifting entry or exit 
barrier of a specific industry, which can be obtained from M&A, is an effective way to 
limit competitive operations.  
 
 
2. Investment Cycle 
 
Greenfield investment cycle mainly includes project feasibility study stage, project 
evaluation and decision making stage, project construction stage and test run stage. 
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Normally, creating a Greenfield venture, from potential market investigation to test run 
and officially operation, requires one to two years. Production in certain scale could be 
reached after three to four years from the beginning. Basically, Merger and Acquisition 
cycle consists of research and evaluation of target company, negotiation and contract 
signing stage, integration period. After M&A, existing resources of the acquire 
company could be immediately redistributed and utilized including management 
scheme, technology, human capital, facilities and distribution channels and clients. The 
whole process may take only several months. Even if the target merging company is in 
need of reform or restructure, it is very likely to be done within no more than one or two 
years. Therefore, in the aspect of investment cycle and its timeliness of having operation 
started, Greenfield investment requires more time to enter the market and gain profit. 
M&A could be much more quickly (generally two years less) to take effect, and thus 
may win quick response to market for investors. 
 
 
3. Financing Structure 
 
Greenfield investment aims to create additional power of production. In Greenfield 
investment, consequently, in spite of material and some intangible input, the investor 
will usually need to inject large amount of liquid to buy machines and other permanent 
assets and ensure the construction of the new project. The financing structure of M&A 
is much more flexible. There are several ways of financing M&A, for instance: 
assumption of debt, buyout, stock exchange, stock holdings operational method. 
Financing solutions can be achieved either by cash or stock. A popular strategy of M&A 
is to acquire certain amount of stock shares of the target company. M&A happens when 
this amount has reached a given bound. 
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4. Risk Control 
 
Greenfield investment has fewer limits from the external factors. Its investors are 
regularly involved in the actual operation of projects, and own better control of risks to 
a large degree. In the contrary, due to asymmetric information and external limits factors, 
the rule of M&A can be influenced and prospective returns may face great uncertainty, 
which is to say M&A investment is more risky than Greenfield. Risks of M&A can be 
reflected from the following four aspects:  
 
A. the actual amount of funding may be blurry if the evaluation agency is not capable 
enough to work out a precise evaluation report or does not offer the true results due to a 
lack of moral constraints. The parent company may further this situation if it does not 
have an accurate grasp of the target company details.  
 
B. Difficulties and divarifications may incur after integration. There is possibilities that 
the two companies are not consistent regarding new policies about power allocation, 
interest allocation, development strategy, management scheme, cultural background, 
etc. 
 
C. If the stock exchange method is in use during M&A, interests of old stock holders 
may be weakened. When the ownership of the newly issued stocks shift, former stocker 
holders (of the acquire company) will have to face a loss of control power over the 
company. 
 
D. The existing contracts and old business relationships may become hampers in the 
way of integration. If the target company leaves behind problems like personnel 
reallocation, arrears of payment and welfare benefit, arrears of taxes and fee for land 
transfer, which are not very likely to be solved independently within a short period, 
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enthusiasm for investment of the parent’s company could be negatively affected. 
 
 
5. Investment Environment of the Host Country 
 
Greenfield form of investment enables the investing company to operate under its own 
development strategies in accordance with its scale of production and location 
investment plans. As long as policies of the host country allow, investors will try to take 
in as much as investment activities under their own control. So limits from outside 
cannot present a strong impact on the running of the Greenfield investment. Different 
from Greenfield, M&A relies external environment a lot. The most distinct fact is that in 
the market of the host country, firms, which are consistent to the aim of investors and 
can potentially become a merging target, must exist. Furthermore, to make M&A 
happen, investing firms will need stock market to complete M&A. Otherwise, parent 
companies will do it through negotiations resulting in agreement. The negotiating ability 
of the target company and interests of other intermediates may compose great impacts 
to the final investment decision as well. As for cross-border M&A, many international 
economic policies and law issues may also be involved. In all, M&A is a kind of 
complex business operation behaviours.  
 
 
(2) Costs and Returns 
 
1. Costs 
 
Cross-border M&A has comparatively more advantages regarding operational costs. 
Reasons are as follows: In essence, M&A is a kind of business operation behaviours 
which aims to internalize all the resources of the target company. Compared with 
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Greenfield investment which origins from internal accumulation of the host company, 
M&A has lower costs in obtaining the existing long-term allocation and collaborative 
operation of human power, financial assets, materials and production, distribution, sales 
channels. Especially when the target company is on the edge of bankruptcy, costs of 
M&A is usually lower than that of replacement, and therefore much more cheaper than 
Greenfield investment. Even if the target company demonstrates well functioned 
business situation, and the buying costs is higher than that of Greenfield, the prospective 
returns and optimistic potentials of the target venture will no doubt shorten the period of 
recovering investing costs, which means that M&A still has comparatively lower costs 
in this assumption. 
 
 
2. Returns 
 
In comparison with Greenfield investment, M&A are in general expecting more returns.  
 
A. Greenfield investment is just a unilateral shift of ownership advantage, while M&A 
is a combination of more than two companies. Well matching target company could be 
complementary to the host enterprise and vice versa. Collaborative advantage will 
surely lead to larger amount of returns. 
 
B. M&A saves a lot time in the market entry process for the parent company. Thus it 
bestows the company the advantage of timely grasping business opportunities. As a 
business expansion strategy, M&A allows the investing company to ‘eat up’ its 
competitors quickly. Both advantages could further stabilize the host company’s 
competitive position in the market and secure its market share. 
 
C. Acquiring an entire company means a lot more than the assets itself. It saves costs in 
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personnel vocational training, market exploration, R&D, brand establishment. This can 
be known as an indirect investment effect. 
 
D. Through M&A, enterprises could reach economies of scale effect within a short time. 
When an upstream or downstream company become merged or acquired by the investor, 
production and distribution are internalized and transactional costs can be reduced. 
 
 
3. Time Factor in Acquiring Strategic Resource 
 
Strategic resource refers to assets and resources that are of strategic significance for 
long-term development of enterprises. It mainly includes R&D ability, brand awareness, 
reputation, concession, and distributional network. Strategic resource is the most crucial 
assets and ownership advantage of enterprises. But they are hard to obtain in external 
markets. If Greenfield is applied in an investment project, the parent company will have 
to and could only use its own strategic resources which origin from internal 
accumulation. The accumulation process usually takes years. M&A, however, could 
well offset this disadvantage by acquiring another economic entity alongside with its 
strategic resources, namely, advanced patents, expertise and know-how, brand and 
trademark, mode of production and management, and distribution network and so on. 
The whole process of M&A, as is mentioned previously, takes much less time. All in all, 
M&A is in an ascendant position against Greenfield if we are considering time factor. 
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(3) Influence to the Host Country 
 
1. Macro-Economic Influence 
 
If other conditions hold, Greenfield investment could not only bring a large amount of 
resources to the target market, it also creates additional production power and to a 
certain degree alleviates local unemployment pressure. Therefore, Greenfield is 
universally welcome by most local governments and other social members. But 
Greenfield may not always be helpful to the improvement and restructure of production 
power and capital stock in the target market. Greenfield investment without accurate 
market research and plans may even become overlapping with similar projects or 
absolutely redundant, which cannot provide extra benefit for the market at all. M&A 
just shifts the ownership of the target company from investors inside the target region 
outward to investors outside. No additional production power will come into being. 
Layoffs and market monopoly by the outside enterprises may even incur. As a result, 
some merger and acquisition projects cannot gain support from local governments. This 
does not mean that M&A does not have a positive side to the local macro-economy. It 
could activate some stock capital that is freezed in the market. If the operation goes 
smoothly, more investment projects may follow up. 
 
 
2. Micro-Economic Influence 
 
The number of firms in an industry is a factor that causes great impact to market share 
and market control distribution. If the number of firms in sector of a certain market 
holds, Greenfield investment will lead to one more extra company joining the market 
competition. This is very likely to raise the competition stress between old market share 
holders and new comers. If M&A is taken as the investing entry mode, number of firms 
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in that industry remains the same, which is to say that M&A does not involve in the 
market share redistribution. While not pushing the opponents into higher level of 
competition and interest conflict, the integration of merging companies may combine 
advantages from multilateral sides and eventually establish a stable and competitive 
place in the target market.  
 
 
3.2.2   Comparative Analysis of Wholly-Owned Firms and Joint Ventures 
 
According to the different ownership structure, the overseas subsidiary, which is 
established through Greenfield or acquired by M&A, can be divided into two kinds: 
wholly owned or joint venture (partly owned). 
 
 
Wholly-owned Investment Mode 
 
(Cross-border) Wholly owned investment mode means that under laws and regulations 
of the host country, the parent company provide funding only by itself to create a new 
subsidiary or acquire all of its stocks in order to gain full control over the target 
company. Eventually, the company in the target market operates in accordance with the 
investor’s production and management instructions. 
 
 
Joint Venture Mode 
 
(Cross-border) Joint Venture mode always involves multilateral parties in the 
investment process. The investing MNE or investors from other countries, under the 
permission of government of target market and legal procedure, join together into a 
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business entity and engage in production and management operations. Apart from initial 
investment, involvers will also share the same development and management scheme, 
profit and loss, and risks. Joint ventures can be further categorized according to the 
different functions: materials and parts supply type, research and development type, 
market sales and distribution type, aim of obtaining foreign products and technology 
type, aim of entering new industry type. No matter which type of joint ventures is 
adopted, they all act under the long-term strategic development plan of the parent firms. 
The purpose of joint venture can be reflected from enterprises’ wish to share and 
combine their advantages in order to achieve mutual benefit. 
 
 
Comparison of Wholly-owned Firms and Joint Ventures 
 
Wholly owned investment and joint ventures have clear distinctions in the several 
aspects, namely control power, investment size, risks, investor size, market reaction 
flexibility, level of classification, influence from the host country, as is shown in Table 
3-2in Appendix. 
 
 
1. Control Power 
 
Wholly owned investment mode allows the parent company to have full control over 
operation and management. In joint venture mode, due to participation of investors from 
the host or other countries, all participants are involved in the operation. Control power 
of each party differs. 
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2. Size of Investment 
 
While wholly owned investment mode requires a large sum of funding, joint venture 
allows investing partners to bear the investment funding together. Thus it is common 
that for a single company, the input for wholly owned investment is much more than 
joint venture method when dealing with the same foreign target project. 
 
 
3. Risks 
 
Since wholly owned investment is fully supplied only by the parent company, it will 
need to take all the responsibilities for any consequence. Therefore, wholly owned 
investment mode exposes its investor to very high risks. As for joint ventures, 
participating investors agree to share loss as well as profits. This is a good way to 
diversify risks. 
 
 
4. Investor Size 
 
Generally speaking, for large MNEs, they do not necessarily need other investment 
partners. They are able to afford the financing for wholly owned investment. This kind 
of investment also rewards them with precious ownership and commercial classification 
advantages. 
 
For small and medium enterprises, they would prefer to diversify risks by choosing joint 
venture mode of entry for their FDI. As joint venture mode is very welcome by local 
governments, it is easier for SMEs to gain support from the host country and access to 
more strategic resources. 
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5. Market Reaction Flexibility 
 
Because wholly owned firms have the advantage of making quick decisions without 
inquiring and negotiating with third parties, they are more likely to demonstrate fast 
reaction to any change in the market. 
 
In comparison, partly owned investment form may not always lead to consensus over 
the specific or long-term development plans and strategies. Conflicts would take place 
especially when issues like unequal interest distribution and personnel appointment 
cannot be well addressed. Internal conflicts may lower workers’ working enthusiasm 
and productivity, and could even lead to disintegration. In all, divarications of cultural 
backgrounds, development strategies and long-term goals will all present joint ventures 
negative impacts on market reaction flexibility. 
 
 
6. Level of Classification 
 
Wholly owned enterprises could protect their trade secrets effectively. But for those 
firms owning advanced technology, going into joint venture means that they will have to 
deal with possibilities of classified secrets exposure. 
 
 
7. Influence from the Host Country 
 
More often than not, host countries would impose special regulations to wholly owned 
firms, which limit their business operations with local enterprises. As the policies can be 
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decisive sometimes, wholly owned investment mode may not be in a position of widely 
support from local government and the public. With joint venture mode, the parent 
companies will find it easier to improve their co-operational relationship with the public 
of the host country. It gives MNEs an incomparable advantage of quick market entry 
possibility and discriminations and unfairness can be avoided. 
 
 
3.3  Conclusion of Chapter 
 
In Chapter Three, this paper mainly discusses about study approaches and theories 
which offer investment entry mode selection strategies. Three classic approaches of 
entry mode research are briefly presented at the beginning of this chapter, namely 
Market Imperfection and Market Failure paradigm, Behavioural paradigm, and 
Resource-based View paradigm. On the basis of the three analysis approaches, theories 
of Transactional Cost and Internalization, Eclectic theory, Internationalization theory, 
and Organization Capability theory are reviewed and commented in the first section of 
this chapter. The second part employs comparison analysis method to study major forms 
of FDI entry modes: Greenfield and M&A, wholly owned firm and joint venture, from 
different aspects. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINESE STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES IN EU FDI ENTRY MODE INFLUENCING FACTORS: CSOES 
AS ORDINARY COMPANIES 
 
 
Chapter Four will be an analysis of possible FDI entry mode selection factors for 
Chinese government-owned enterprises investing in EU. In this chapter, the paper will 
take Chinese state-owned enterprises as ordinary companies, and thus we are able to 
apply the earlier discussed FDI theories to these state enterprises and examine the entry 
mode factors in a general sense. 
 
From the colligation of the theoretical introduction in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we now 
have a list of theories that could possibly affect selection of FDI entry mode. 
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Table 4-1 FDI Entry Mode Selection Related Theories and Elements that might 
potentially influence Entry Mode 
FDI Entry Mode Related Theories 
Theoretical Focus and Elements that 
Might Potentially Influence Entry Mode 
 
Theories 
Directly 
Related to FDI 
Entry Mode 
Transactional Cost theory 
and Internalization theory 
Transferrable advantage character, 
transfer capability 
Eclectic theory 
Transferrable advantage character and 
value, transfer capability, host country 
environment 
Internationalization 
(Strategy) theory 
Tactics about advantage transfer and 
adjustment to host country 
Organization Capability 
theory Reinforcement of company advantage 
Other Theories 
Indirectly 
Related to FDI 
Entry Mode 
Monopolistic Advantage 
theory 
Transferrable advantage character, host 
country policy 
Product Life Cycle theory 
Host country infrastructure, Cultural 
difference 
 
 
According to the elaboration of FDI entry mode selection related theories and the Table 
4-1, we could make a brief summary that: 
 
A. All the theories have adopted ‘advantage transfer’ approach in explaining FDI 
phenomena; 
B. Every single of the FDI entry mode influencing factors mentioned in the these 
theories is connected with either MNE or host country. 
 
If we take MNE as the start point of FDI and host country as the end, it seems very 
logic that we could divide all the influencing factors into two groups: advantage transfer 
start point factors and advantage transfer end factors. As other ordinary investing MNEs, 
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FDI entry mode selection of Chinese state-owned enterprises would be affected by these 
two types of factors as well. Specifically, candidate factors are listed as follows. 
 
Advantage transfer start point factors (internal factors) refer to factors from the MNE 
side, including: 
 
1. Enterprise product and service factor 
2. Motivation 
3. Developing strategy 
4. Company performance 
5. Investment experience in the host country 
 
Advantage transfer end factors (external factors) are influencing factors on the host 
country’s side, including: 
 
 1.  EU investment related laws, policies and regulations 
2.  Level of Economic Development and Marketization 
3.  Quality of Infrastructure in EU 
4.  Social and Cultural Background of Europe 
5.  Local Partner 
6.  Influencing Factors from Inside China 
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4.1   FDI Entry Mode Factors Study: Advantage Transfer Start Point Factors 
 
 
1. Enterprise Product and Service Factor 
 
Enterprise product and service is a direct and intuitional reflection of the company’s 
knowledge and technology advantage. The influence of enterprises’ product and service 
on the choice of investment entry mode can be reflected from several aspects, 
includingproduct and service differentiation and product technology. The more different 
a company’s products and services are from those of other firms, the more advantages it 
will have, and the more likely that the company will choose wholly owned investment 
mode. Products, which contains high technology and has a life cycle, also known as 
technology concentrated products would normally contribute to the selection of wholly 
owned mode or make the company become the major share holder in a joint venture, in 
order to project the ownership of the technology. If a company owns the technology and 
monopoly over the logo, patent, and core knowledge of a product which could quickly 
adapt local market, its owner may want to use Greenfield then. Chinese products are 
well known for cheap prices, and also low value-added elements. This is still the fact 
with most Chinese firms in general. But in order to add more technology into products 
and acquire core technology and brand effect, China’s government-owned enterprises 
are starting to think more about acquiring European big brand companies. Examples are 
M&A cases of Chinese government-owned electric appliance enterprise TCL with 
French Thomson Electrics Corporation in 2004, and Nanjing Automobile Corporation 
(NAC) with UK MG-Rover in 2005. In European market, there are state-owned 
enterprises from China with high-tech products as well. At present, Chinese state-owned 
aerospace firms’ investment in EU contains world leading technology and the investors 
should, therefore, pay much attention in the protection of its commercial knowledge and 
secrets when deciding which FDI entry mode should be in use. 
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2. Motivation of Investing in EU 
 
Generally, the motivation of Chinese state-owned enterprises’ investing in EU is to seek 
for natural resources, technology, potential markets, distribution channels, or 
management experience. Different investment motivations will on a large degree decide 
procedure of investing operation, and thus lead to different choices of FDI entry modes. 
We may use examples to illustrate this point. For investing enterprises which are after 
foreign high technology and distribution channels in EU, M&A will present them a 
shortcut in achieving their long-term goal; as for enterprises looking for long-term target 
market or trade barrier evading, no matter wholly-owned form or joint venture entry 
mode used, Greenfield is always a good choice. 
 
 
3. Enterprise Developing Strategy 
 
A majority of Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in EU are large-scale firms 
which have clear developing strategies. Their developing strategies will no doubt 
impose an impact on their decision of FDI entry mode selection. In the early time of 
Chinese financial enterprises investing in EU, Chinese central bank and the four major 
commercial banks all opened wholly owned representative offices in London. Their 
aims are mainly set as market information collection. Basically, developing strategies 
used by state-owned enterprises investing in EU include enterprise strategic upgrade, 
reform or globalization deploy. Investment mode combined with globalization deploy 
developing strategy can be very flexible. If enterprises desire business upgrades or 
internal reform or transformation, they are more likely to use M&A mode in their 
overseas investment. Normally, most Chinese state-owned enterprises have a systematic 
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and strict requirement in the development of their foreign subsidiaries. In order to make 
sure foreign branches are functioning in consistency with the developing strategy of the 
global headquarter, parent companies will need to be the major share holder of their 
subsidiaries. 
 
 
4. Enterprise Performance 
 
The business performance, financial status, and profitability capability of the parent 
company could also influence its FDI entry mode. A well functioning and profitable 
company with sufficient liquidity supply could face lower risks when operating in 
foreign countries. As a consequence, they would like to be wholly owned investors. But 
this does not deny their going into M&A as M&A will be a reliable method in 
diversifying risks. Enterprises of excellent credit standing would also favour Greenfield 
investment as they have strong financial backup. 
 
 
5. Investment Experience in the Host Country 
 
Former experience of investing in the host country plays a very important role in 
Chinese state-owned enterprises FDI mode selection. As is discussed earlier, in general, 
enterprises without enough investment experience in the target market will prefer to 
choose M&A method to enter. By doing this, they could not only obtain strategic 
resources from the merged local companies, but also instant business local operation 
experience and adapt themselves into the target market. It also seems straightforward 
that Chinese government enterprises with insufficient EU investment experience would 
favour partially-owned entry as the collaboration mechanism could off-trade their 
unfamiliarity with local market. 
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4.2   FDI Entry Mode Factors Study: Advantage Transfer End Point Factors 
 
Advantage transfer end point factors are not located on MNEs’ side, which means in 
this paper that they are not controlled by China’s state-owned enterprise. There are 
mainly two types of external factors: influencing factors from EU side and factors from 
inside China. 
 
 
4.2.1   Advantage Transfer End Point Factors from EU Side 
 
 
1. EU Investment Related Laws, Policies and Regulations 
 
Investment activities in EU must obey European and the host country’s laws and 
policies. These legal bindings and restrictions provide a framework in which foreign 
investment projects could be operated. Factors of FDI related laws, policies and 
regulations cannot be controlled or changed by investing firms. Laws of European 
members set bound for foreign stock holders in M&A mode of investment as well as 
standards and common practice of ownership transfer, foreign exchange management, 
customs and taxations, profit repatriation, etc. For some highly sensitive industries and 
high return rate and low risk monopolistic industries, local governments would even 
introduce related laws in order to limit foreign investors’ participation. All of these may 
influence foreign firms’ decision on FDI entry mode. Due to the uniqueness of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises, their investment behaviours may be further restricted by some 
targeted provisions in some countries. 
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The investment policy of the host country plays an important role in foreign investors’ 
deciding the final selection of FDI entry mode. Especially some European countries 
have put very high barrier in the restriction of M&A and their policies may set a limit in 
the share of some proportions that foreign investors are allowed to hold in joint ventures. 
Therefore, during the decision making process before actual investment, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises will need to study policies and regulations of the host country, 
and choose FDI entry mode correspondingly. The ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe’, which was signed by leaders of EU member states in 2004, modified foreign 
investment (including inward and outward investment) related policies and regulations 
of EU member states, and incorporated them into the same framework for European 
trade. Unfortunately, this treaty has not taken effect officially by so far. Taking financial 
industry as an example, all of the four major Chinese state-owned commercial banks 
have business operations in Europe. But many EU countries have clear restrictions 
toward foreign financial institutes, which greatly cumber Chinese banks’ business 
expansions in EU. With strict policy limits, it is very difficult for Chinese banks to 
obtain licences of universal banks in UK. Policies of Greece and Italy also impose 
negative impacts to China’s wholly owned banks. Under such situation, therefore, M&A 
mode of entry is a better choice for Chinese commercial banks. China Development 
Bank has already started its M&A operations in EU and made an excellent example for 
other Chinese financial institutes by acquiring 7% stocks of Barclay UK.  
 
As for other highly sensitive industries like resource, Radio and TV broadcasting, air 
transport, Some EU countries, such as Poland, Spain, Hungary, Sweden, have certain 
entry restrictions. Due to the uniqueness of Chinese state-owned enterprise as the main 
investing body, more requirements are imposed on to these firms besides merely 
obtaining investment authorization from related departments. Chinese state-owned firms 
which are investing in Hungarian Radio and TV broadcasting sectors and Swedish 
resource area will have to take M&A form as their FDI entry mode and the amount of 
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stock shares they are holding are restricted. Similar policies and regulations could also 
be found in Spain. These policies and regulations will inevitably impact the selection of 
investment entry mode during China’s state-owned enterprises’ decision making 
process. 
 
In addition to certain policies and regulations which affect the selection of FDI entry 
mode, a part of EU member states directly set restrictions for cross-border M&A and 
Greenfield investments. In the recent years, Chinese state-owned enterprises are getting 
increasingly enthusiastic about using M&A mode to enter foreign markets. But on the 
contrary, EU member states have begun to take obvious measures of promulgating 
corresponding investment policies with reasons of security. Regarding Greenfield 
investment mode, firms seeking for establish wholly owned subsidiaries in Sweden 
need specific authorization from local authorities. 
 
For EU countries, however, to attract foreign investment is still a very important 
economic tool in accelerating growth. With this reason, many of them provide generous 
offers through making foreign investment friendly policies and regulations, as is shown 
in the table. So when Chinese state-owned enterprises are making decisions on what 
investment entry mode to choose, they should consider making full use of these 
preferential policies. But some of these special polices are only for domestic companies, 
and UK is an example in this case. Under this circumstances, merging with or acquiring 
domestic firms in the target country would be the best choice for Chinese companies. 
 
 
2. Level of Economic Development and Marketization 
 
Among the 27 EU member states, 15 old members like Germany, UK, France have 
comparatively higher level of economic development and marketization. Enterprises in 
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these countries are more likely to have technology and management system which could 
well match the standard for MNE development, and can be readily used by parent 
companies. As a result, when entering old EU member states’ market, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises prefer to use M&A entry mode. As for new EU member states 
like Czech and Poland, whose economic development and industrialization level are 
relatively lagged behind, Chinese investors may favour Greenfield or wholly owned 
entry mode in order to utilize comparative price and cost advantages in this region. 
 
 
3. Quality of Infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure of good condition factor plays a very important role in attracting foreign 
investment. It is also a factor of significance in deciding FDI entry mode. Without good 
infrastructure, MNEs will inevitably face higher business operational costs and become 
frustrated in effectively allocating resources worldwide. Besides the advantage of 
accessing FDI of higher levels, well developed infrastructure in transportation, 
communication, energy, and power transmission etc. could also bring up the scale and 
quality of MNE’s local operations. It creates a hardware environment for foreign firms’ 
learning process and R&D, which consequently serves as an important incentive driving 
up the overall FDI attractiveness in the country. For one thing, as crucial factors in the 
investment decision making process of MNEs, infrastructure’s maturity and quality are 
closely and positively connected with the overall amount of investment injection from 
abroad. For another thing, the maturity and quality of infrastructure make a contributing 
impact on the speed of knowledge transfer within a country. The better infrastructure a 
country has, the faster information will be delivered and the more foreign investors will 
be negatively affected by asymmetric information. On the contrary, the disadvantage of 
not having good infrastructural system can be reflected from higher transactional costs, 
asymmetric information availability, and lower efficiency of carrying out investment 
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plans of foreign investors. Most investing enterprises will prefer Greenfield mode when 
they want to enter countries with good infrastructures and M&A for others. Although 
infrastructure quality in new EU member states are less satisfied compared with those of 
former EU members, in recent years new EU members have also given a lot emphasis 
on building high quality infrastructures. Therefore, the future will definitely see a rapid 
development in M&A activities between Chinese state-owned enterprise and firms of 
new EU member states. 
 
 
4. Social and Cultural Background of Europe 
 
European Union has numbers of highly developed economies in the world and social 
and cultural background of various kinds. As a nation with a long history and Eastern 
cultural background with European countries, China has much difference in cultural 
value, social structure, language and lifestyle when interact and communicate with 
European countries. This could also be an influencing factor that may bias the selection 
of FDI entry mode. Usually if the social and cultural background of the host country is 
close or similar with that of the investment origin country, wholly-owned entry mode 
will probably be more acceptable in the target market. Nowadays, under the background 
of globalization, the linkage of different countries’ languages and culture is becoming 
unprecedentedly distinct, more and more interactions and communications opportunities 
have made FDI entry much easier than ever before. It is always wise to undertake 
Greenfield investment in countries which have good historical connections and use 
M&A method in countries which are not very familiar with. For instance, most new EU 
member states are geographically closer to China and some CIS countries have friendly 
connections in the history. As a consequence, these countries, to a certain degree, have 
similar identities with China and closer psychological distance than old EU member 
states, and therefore more welcome toward Chinese investors. 
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5. Local Partner 
 
In M&A investment activities, if the business concept of a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise is coherent with its partner’s, both sides would be motivated to work together 
and towards the same goal. If the choice of partner is inappropriate, it can be risky for 
the running of joint ventures and harm the co-operational relationship. 
 
 
4.2.2   Advantage Transfer End Point Factors from China 
 
Factors from China’s side mainly include domestic competition and policies. 
Commonly if the volume of domestic market is big enough for firms’ potential 
development, firms will prefer to stay in domestic market. When they are expecting 
strict limits on their development space in domestic market, or excessive competitions, 
they will be thinking about exploring foreign market and going for FDI. Firms on this 
developing stage are mostly large enterprises and are able to afford themselves for 
overseas Greenfield projects. On the contrary, if the overall market value is not big 
enough and firms choose to go abroad at an early stage, their sizes are often smaller and 
this may make them in favour of M&A type investment entry strategy. Moreover, 
production resource availability, financial market development level, and government’s 
investment policies will all causes impacts on firms’ choice between wholly owned and 
joint venture. 
 
Normally, investment policies of the (investment origin) mother country will not 
necessarily affect FDI entry mode selection of its domestic firms. However, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises have deep connection with central government, so they could 
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benefit from Chinese policies as well. When a kind of resource is in urgent need, 
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission will usually bring in a special 
government fund in direct supporting state-owned energy enterprises to invest in foreign 
energy assets. 
 
Apart from policies and regulations of EU member states, China’s own investment 
policies also have strong leading effect in Chinese state-owned enterprises’ selection of 
FDI entry modes. In 2004, according to ‘Notice of the State Development and Reform 
Commission and the Export-Import Bank of China on Relevant Issues on Providing 
Credit Supports to the Key Overseas Investment Projects Encouraged by the State’, the 
State Development and Reform Commission and the Export-Import Bank of China 
together began to provide credit supports to Chinese firms overseas investment 
activities. Besides Greenfield form, the key overseas investment projects mentioned in 
the notice also includes large scale overseas M&A projects which could quickly 
enhance enterprise international competitiveness and expand potential foreign markets. 
As many cross-border merger and acquisition operations are taken in the form of 
international competitive bidding, these investment friendly policies will no doubt 
become a strong support and encouragement in promoting China’s FDI. 
 
Meanwhile, China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
serves as a supervisor towards key investment projects of central enterprises. 
Documents like ‘Notice of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council on Strengthening Administration over the Foreign 
Investment Activities of Central Enterprises’ has clarified and simplified the procedure 
of submitting applications of prospective investment projects, which may also imply the 
investment entry mode selection preference. 
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4.3  Conclusion of Chapter 
 
Under the framework of foreign direct investment theories, this chapter treated Chinese 
state enterprises as ordinary MNEs and attempted to categorize possible FDI 
influencing factors intotwo groups: advantage transfer start point factors and advantage 
transfer end factors. In this chapter, the paper put Chinese state-owned enterprises into 
standard entry mode influencing factor selection procedure and analyzed potential 
influencing factors from both internal and external side in detail. Factors are listed in 
Table 4-2. 
 
 
Table 4-2 FDI Entry Mode Influencing Factors (CSOE as Ordinary Companies) 
Advantage Transfer Start Point Factors 
(Internal) 
Advantage Transfer End Factors 
(External) 
Enterprise product and service factor 
EU investment related laws, policies and 
regulations 
Motivation 
Level of Economic Development and 
Marketization 
Developing strategy Quality of Infrastructure in EU 
Company performance Social and Cultural Background of Europe 
Investment experience in the host country Local Partner 
 Influencing Factors from Inside China 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SWOT ANALYSIS OF CHINESE STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES IN EU FDI ENTRY MODE INFLUENCING FACTORS: CSOES 
AS GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES 
 
 
After discussing the FDI entry mode influencing factors of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises as ordinary companies in the last chapter, we need to shift our attention to 
the uniqueness of these government-controlled enterprises. As a nation, China is 
different from all EU member states in its form of government; as a market, China 
regards itself as a unique socialist market economy. Thus, as a blend of government and 
market-based entity, Chinese state-owned enterprise has many special characteristics 
that other ordinary firms do not possess. Chapter Five will deal with the special 
characteristics of Chinese government enterprises. With the help of SWOT analysis 
methodology, the paper will examine advantages and disadvantages originated from 
Chinese state-owned enterprise as special government enterprises participating overseas 
investment operations. In the latter part of the chapter, a summary of potential 
opportunities and threats will be brought up to form a systematic SWOT study. 
 
 
5.1  Special Characteristics of China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
 
1. The most distinct characteristic of Chinese state-owned enterprises lies in its special 
ownership structure. Different from ordinary companies which are created base on 
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freedom of civil contracts, state-owned enterprises in China are founded on the basis 
of interest of entire state. All the people of China as a whole own the assets of the 
company or the major part of it. They are directly controlled by the central or local 
governments. For companies in China under such structure of ownership, they 
benefit from clear advantages of many aspects. As they are all founded and 
supported by Chinese government, their vision during decision making process and 
capability in investment operations are automatically set to a quite high level due to 
the government involvement. This also reflects their higher level of risk tolerance. 
However, being wholly-owned by ‘all the people’ and controlled by government 
may otherwise present difficulties for them. Rights, obligations implement and 
interest distribution corresponding to their owners, decision makers, business 
administrators, and workers can be ambiguous, and consequently hard to be bound 
with normal Civil Law.  
 
Due to the unique ownership structure of Chinese state-owned enterprises, they 
always maintain an interdependent relationship with the government. Their aims of 
engagement into commercial activities reveal the will of Chinese government and 
could be beyond simple business objectives. As an effective tool of controlling and 
leading the country, the central government establishes state-owned enterprises to 
control national economy secure state stability, pursue high-tech industrial 
development and so on. In order to endow these firms with sufficient power, 
Chinese government gives them privileges to operate in certain concessionary and 
sensitive industries. Sometimes, such privileges mean monopoly. Even when 
state-owned enterprises encounter great setbacks, they will very often obtain huge 
financial aid and policy support. As a side effect of support from powerful 
government, every single move of China’s state-owned enterprise overseas 
operation and their motives will be carefully watched over by of foreign 
governments. Political interference factor can be decisive during foreign investment 
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operations. In the case of merger negotiation between Chinalco (Aluminum 
Corporation of China Limited) and Rio Tinto, agreement finally came to be broken 
up by Rio Tinto. One of the important reasons behind the failure of the deal is 
Australian government’s fear of losing its control power over the state mining 
industry against Beijing. In this sense, the ‘insecure image’ of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises could potentially remain as a disadvantage in international market 
competition. 
 
Over years, Chinese government has played a key role in regulating large 
state-owned enterprises investing abroad. The selection of FDI entry mode, target 
sector, investment location and many other aspects are not simply decisions of 
state-owned enterprises according to market considerations. The government is 
usually involved in making investment plans and it directs the investment projects to 
fulfilling special objectives of China’s long-term interests. In most cases, the state 
interests are in the form of gaining access to foreign technology, information, 
markets and natural resource reserves. As a consequent, there is a high possibility of 
state-owned enterprises which are seeking to take over larger foreign companies to 
secure support from the government. 
 
2.  In the management of state-owned enterprises, the central government respects a 
fundamental principle: ‘to invigorate large enterprises while relaxing control over 
small ones’. The role of government in market economy is in general to offset the 
market failure and interfere in market adjustment for necessity. Due to historical 
reasons, however, in China, state-owned companies can be seen almost in every 
industry. In order not to disperse material and financial resources or to be pinned 
down by firms under adverse financial condition, Chinese government decided to 
focus their energy on the restructuring and development of major enterprises and 
leave minor ones to fend themselves. As a result, starting from 1980s, the reform of 
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state-owned enterprises has driven numbers of large state companies merge together 
and small firms go private. Integration and resource centralization enables the earlier 
leading companies in each field to transform into competitive flagships in overseas 
expansion. As we could see from the investing company list (Table 5-1 in 
Appendix), nearly all existing Chinese state-owned enterprises participating foreign 
direct investment are large-scale corporations. Therefore, compared with other 
MNEs, China’s state-owned enterprises were born with advantages of larger size 
and stronger risk resistance capability. National monopolistic positions give many of 
them the strength to seek for overseas development opportunities in fields and 
industries of varieties. Yet flagship size will not always guarantee their successful in 
foreign investment project. Lack of EU investment experience and international 
management skills have broken dreams of many Chinese state-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, insufficient high level employees and managerial personnel remain to be 
a difficult problem after entering EU market. 
 
 In general, high degree of resource centralization characteristic gives Chinese 
government enterprises clear ownership advantages over their products, services and 
brand recognition effect, which enable them to engage in global competition on a 
large variety of objects (technology, natural resource, and brands in most cases) and 
sectors. Often than not, objectives of large-scale Chinese state-owned enterprise 
overseas operations can be reflected in their entry mode choices in two folds: either 
to acquire technology and strategic resource by enter under M&A, or expand 
markets and establish R&D institutes with Greenfield entry form. 
 
3.  Policy support is a strong backing to government-owned enterprises in China. The 
central government has been playing a very active role in encouraging state-owned 
enterprises to absorb foreign technology and resource through M&A form. Besides 
existing policies on tax reduction and cross-border tariff agreements, the voice of 
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encouraging state-owned enterprises to ‘go outside’ has been heard frequently. In 
several occasions, Premier Jiabao Wen and Rongrong Li, Dean of State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council expressed 
their encouragement for state enterprises to invest abroad under the international 
stagnancy after 2008 world-wide financial crisis. An official notice was issued by 
SASAC in 2004 in order to create better investment policy and regulation 
environment for state enterprises with future overseas investment plans. Credit 
support and simplified FDI application procedure would surely promote the 
investment projects of China’s government enterprises. Policy and regulation may 
also serve as directions from the government in deciding state enterprises’ foreign 
strategies. Still it is needed to be pointed out that many Chinese state-owned 
enterprises have suffered huge loss from their FDI projects, which may potentially 
cause a negative impact to the rest national firms when they make decision about 
whether to take the challenge. More policies of FDI incentives should be in place. 
 
4.  Another characteristic of China’s state-owned enterprise is the privilege of special 
financing channels, including state financial allocation, national bank loans, and 
central government’s financing source from international market. Diversified 
financing channels provide strong and stable impulse to these firms and the whole 
industry. As a result, whenthese government firms are going global, they would be 
more economically independent in adopting wholly-owned Greenfield investment 
mode, as well as other modes with partnership involvement. But with larger 
financial stakes at hand, have Chinese state-owned enterprises made full use of it 
into investment? The answer is No. As the level of economic development increased, 
market economy became further mature, and international commercial competition 
upgraded onto higher level , the problem of economic inefficiency of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises have been gradually exposed to the public. Only in the year 
2008, the loss from state enterprise overseas merger and acquisition actions totalled 
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200 billion RMB12
                                                          
12 Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Database 
, which is even larger than the scale of successful operations. 
 
5.  Most state-owned enterprises enjoy good reputation and reliability. This is not only 
because China’s state enterprises have the central government as backing, but also 
for the reason that, in all countries, state-owned enterprises are much stronger in 
their viability than normal companies. They cannot go bankrupt as easily as private 
firms. Law in some countries even has provision claiming state-owned enterprises 
are not allowed to go bankrupt or change business direction without the permission 
organs of state power, parliament in most cases. Such satisfying stability 
characteristic would no doubt be very helpful in securing market positions and 
gaining trusts of partners in M&A and joint venture entry modes. Reputation 
advantage is not alone without incidentals. A weak point come hand in hand with the 
state enterprise’s stability: the market exit barriers for state-owned enterprises are 
very high. This could be the causes of two potential disadvantageous outcomes. For 
one thing, better stability factor automatically make managers and workers in these 
enterprises lose competition pressure and their sense of crisis, which may lead to 
dangerous results. For another thing, stability factor make industrial restructuring of 
state-owned enterprises less possible. This could further deteriorate market change 
adaptability of these firms. 
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Table 5-2 Special Characteristics of China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Strengths 
and Weaknesses 
Special 
Characteristics 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Special 
Ownership 
Structure 
Chinese government support; 
broad vision; high risk tolerance 
sector advantage; privileges to 
operate in certain concessionary 
and sensitive sectors; legitimate 
monopoly; aid support after 
setbacks 
Ambiguous bound between 
rights, obligations and interest 
distribution; hard to be bound 
with normal Civil Law 
‘insecure image’; possibility of 
political interference 
Large-scale in 
Size, Resource 
Centralization 
Monopolistic position in market; 
strong risk resistance capability 
Lack of EU investment 
experience, international 
management skills, and 
high-class employees 
Policy Support Favourable policy preference 
More FDI incentives policies 
needed 
Privilege Of 
Special Financing 
Channels 
Easy access to finance; strong and 
stable push to commercial 
development 
Low financial efficiency; huge 
loss in overseas investment 
Reputation and 
Reliability 
Easier to secure market positions 
and nice credit standing 
High exit barriers; reduce of 
competition pressure; less 
possibility of restructuring 
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5.2  Opportunities and Threats of China’s State-Owned Enterprises in EU 
 
 
The analysis of Chinese state-owned enterprises’ special characteristics helped us 
understand why these enterprises controlled by Chinese government different from 
other ordinary companies and where their strengths and weaknesses lie in. When put 
into the global market, Chinese state-owned enterprises must prepare themselves to face 
with the opportunities and threats derived from their unique positions. With a link to the 
earlier European market background analysis, the following part will be a study of the 
opportunities and threats to be faced with. 
 
 
5.2.1  Opportunities of China’s State-Owned Enterprises in EU 
 
1. China’s persistent economic growth and years of positive foreign reserves has 
bestowed Chinese state-owned enterprises sufficient financial backup to take steps 
outside. Survival of the fittest principle has entitled the existing state-owned 
enterprises in China winners from decades of native market competition. They have 
accumulated large amount of assets and capital available for investment potentials. 
Industries especially like electric appliance have already seized comparative 
advantages and met conditions to invest abroad. For them, in order to keep 
developing and remain competitive, utilizing global resource and market 
environment is becoming the next strategic move consequentially.  
 
2. Global financial crisis has presented increasing opportunities of merger and 
acquisition. Although the world is recovering from the financial crisis, post-crisis 
impacts still remain in EU, one of the victims who have suffered the most from the 
crisis. Some European companies, including a few number of world class 
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enterprises, are faced with unprecedented financial and operational stress. To get out 
of adverse situation, they have to put non-core assets on sale. For Chinese 
state-owned firms, these assets are not ‘trash’, but potential ‘win-win’ stakes as they 
could be helpful in promoting their own brands.  
 
3. Deepening of globalization urges Chinese state-owned companies to take new 
challenges. After joining WTO in the beginning of the new century, with less 
business hurdles, Chinese government has been holding a very optimistic view in 
trading and bilateral investing with other members. The 2004 EU enlargement 
further reinforced the key role of EU on the international market and offered fair 
trade platforms for Chinese government investors and EU member states. 
 
4. Chinese government-owned enterprise’ investing in EU could offset the pressure of 
trade surplus and growing foreign reserves. China has seen a favourable balance in 
trading with EU for years. At the same time, investment inflow from EU has also 
outpaced the outflow. This made China under great pressure in Chinese RMB (Yuan) 
appreciation. What Beijing is urgently needed to do is to seek for a balance of 
capital flow rather than to keep accumulate capital. Investing in EU could 
effectively change the current trade imbalance, alleviate Yuan appreciation pressure, 
and improve foreign reserve use efficiency. 
 
5. Another opportunity can be seen from demographic aspect. There are overseas 
Chinese in many of EU member states. Their cultural and psychological intimacy 
with China is a valuable asset in providing information on local culture and market. 
So in host countries with overseas Chinese concentration, they could potentially 
play important roles in ensuring Chinese firms’ quick adaptation. 
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5.2.2  Threats of China’s State-Owned Enterprises in EU 
 
1. Lack of overseas investment experience and managerial experts. The past decades 
could see Chinese state-owned enterprises’ clear improvement in native enterprise 
managerial experience and technology development. When they are participating 
investment project abroad, however, their lack of experience and expertise in 
management is fully exposed. In order to cut costs, some companies even do not 
take standard procedure during investment process, M&A especially. For example, 
some enterprises do not even go through thorough study of the target company and 
market, which definitely leave high possibilities of risk; some entrepreneurs have 
too much faith in their foreign partner that they do not send managerial team or CFO 
but let their subsidiary run fully on its own. This is very likely to end with huge loss 
from asset misappropriation. In addition, short of managerial experts is another 
threat. Investing enterprises need experts of rich experience and managerial skills. 
Also these experts will have to be very familiar with the host country market and 
able to conduct effective communication with locals. Without reserves of expertise 
and experts of this kind, it is highly difficult for Chinese state-owned to recruit 
qualified experts in time when the investment projects are about to happen, which 
inevitably brings problems after completing the deal. 
 
2. Integration difficulty arise from cultural difference contributes further to the threats 
in front of Chinese government. Chinese Confucianism-based managerial culture 
causes many challenges to concepts of freedom, equality, and human rights in 
European subsidiaries. Sometimes, Chinese national enterprises may bring even 
stronger Chinese enterprise managerial culture, like combination of market business 
and political interference. Therefore, integration difficulties and conflicts from 
culture different are especially serious for Chinese enterprises entering under M&A 
mode. 
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3. In addition, defects resulted from inefficient managerial and administrative 
structures have been causing losses for Chinese state-owned enterprises. 
Bureaucracy and capital escape are among typical defects. Affected by Chinese 
government organizing structure, state enterprises and entrepreneurs are majorly 
bureaucratic. Examination and approval procedure for foreign investment projects is 
usually complex and takes much time. As a result, investing enterprises are very 
likely to miss the best chance in carrying out their plans. Some entrepreneurs of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises are very much like politicians in their way of 
thinking: they prefer big projects with huge funding support, and the results must be 
good-looking as that would be added to their list of social contribution. Bureaucracy 
and low efficiency further lead Chinese state-owned enterprises into capital escapes 
predicaments. Every year, millions of investment funds are lost by Chinese 
state-owned enterprises during FDI activities due to factors of irresponsible 
management, ill-functioned administration, corruption and bankruptcy.  
 
4. ‘China threat’ is becoming an increasingly important hurdle for Chinese state-owned 
enterprises. With Chinese enterprises’ fast expansion active involvement into 
cross-border investment activities around the globe, the spectre of ‘China threat’ has 
been raised by some foreign powers. The most sensitive industry is natural resource. 
In recent years, Chinese state-owned natural resource oriented companies have 
frequently participate in overseas resource company bidding. China, as one of the 
world’s largest resource consumers and at the same time, the biggest exporters and 
fastest growing economies, has attracted the attention of the whole world. The needs 
for large amount of natural resources and huge sum of purchases have made China 
‘an aggressive predator’ in the world resource market. This is especially the case 
when Chinese state-owned enterprises are dealing with Western companies. In the 
cases of 2005 China National offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) bidding for 
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Unocal and 2009 Chinalco’s bidding for Australian Rio Tinto, political interference 
from the host country acted a crucial factor in leading the deals to failure. Likely, 
Chinese state-owned enterprises should be prepared themselves to deal with similar 
frustration in EU resource market. 
 
5. Threats from other large multinational competitors. In general large foreign MNEs 
have huge sum of assets and lion share of international markets. They are equipped 
with outstanding financing capacity and technological and managerial advantages, 
and better understanding of the world market. Failed competition operation with 
these MNEs often means massive loss. In 2009, Chinalco lost billions of USD13
 
 
Table 5-3 Opportunities and Threats of China’s State-Owned Enterprises in EU 
 in 
the bid for Rio Tinto against BMP. 
Opportunities Threats 
Benefit from Chinese growing economy, 
sufficient financial backup 
Lack of overseas investment 
experience and managerial experts 
Global financial crisis forces some foreign 
companies to sell assets at low prices 
Integration difficulty; cultural 
difference 
Deepening of globalization; lower trade barriers 
after joining WTO 
Managerial and administrative 
imperfection; bureaucracy and capital 
escape 
Ooffsetting the pressure of trade surplus and 
growing foreign reserves, and stress of Yuan 
appreciation 
‘China threat’; huge need for natural 
resources; aggressive expansions 
Overseas Chinese ensuring Chinese firms’ 
quick adaptation 
Threats from foreign MNEs 
                                                          
13 Exact number of Chinalco’s loss has been unknown. According to CHINA SECRECY ON-LINE, the 
loss totaled 700 billion RMB (106 billion USD approximately). 
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5.3  Conclusion of Chapter 
 
The entire Chapter Five served as a SWOT framework in analyzing potential FDI entry 
mode influencing elements from the aspect of Chinese state-owned enterprises’ 
uniqueness. Strengths and Weaknesses derived from special characteristics of China’s 
government enterprises were first discussed. Then with reference the overall EU 
investment environment, the paper advanced SWOT analysis by proposing the 
opportunities and threats that Chinese state-owned enterprises may face during their 
FDI entry mode decision making process and the post-deal business running. Outcomes 
from SWOT analysis are listed in Table 5-4 in Appendix.  
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CHAPTER SIX   INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK OF FDI ENTRY MODE 
SELECTION FOR CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES INVESTING IN 
EU AND FRAMEWORK APPLICATION BASED ON CASE STUDIES 
 
 
The main discussion of the last two chapters focused on finding potential FDI entry 
mode influencing factors for Chinese state-owned enterprises from two perspectives: as 
ordinary firms and special government-owned enterprises. To establish a framework of 
entry modeselection, we need to combine the findings from the two perspectives and 
extract the best combinations for the best fit FDI entry mode candidates, with a 
reference to the current patterns of entry modes which Chinese state-owned enterprises 
are using in EU.  
 
Chapter Six consists of three major parts. The first part will be a summary of current 
FDI entry mode features of Chinese state-owned enterprises in EU. This part will serve 
as a reference background for the next part, where all the finding of previous discussion 
will be linked together and the final entry mode selection framework proposed. Case 
studies under the framework follow in the last part. 
 
 
6.1  FDI Entry Mode Features of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in EU 
 
China initialized large scale FDI in EU from 1980s. By so far, China Ocean Shipping 
Company (COSCO), China Minmetals Corporation, China General Technology Holding 
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(Genertec) have all made successes in their overseas investment experiences. Although 
entry modes of FDI which these companies have adopted are various, we could still 
grasp some similarities in their entry mode patterns. Through studies of China’s FDI in 
EU, we could notice that the investment entry modes used by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises have some clear features. These features can be summarized as specific 
industry concentration feature, specific country concentration feature, investment 
strategy concentration feature, and investment stage concentration feature. 
 
 
6.1.1  Specific Industry Concentration Feature 
 
Chinese state-owned enterprises that belong to the same industry show clear similarities 
in some aspects during their investment activities. 
 
1. Automobile and Motor Cycle Industries 
 
When entering EU, Chinese automobile and motor cycle firms all adopted M&A mode 
of entry.  
 
Table 6-1 Automobile and Motor Cycle Industry Chinese State-owned Enterprises 
FDI Projects after 2001 
Enterprises 
Name 
Time of 
M&A 
Acquiree M&A Type New Company/Institute 
SAIC 2007 Ricardo 2010 
UK 
Wholly 
M&A 
SAIC Motor UK 
Technical Center Limited 
NAC 2005 MG-Rover 
UK 
Partly M&A NAC MG-Rover 
QianJiang 
Motor 
2005 Benelli Italy - Qianjiang Europe Co., Ltd 
Source: Release of Country/Region Report on China’s Outward Investment Promotion. And SAIC 
Official website: http://www.saicgroup.com/Chinese/sqjt/gsjs/ 
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The results of these M&A investment projects turned out to be quite satisfying. As can 
be seen from the Table 6-1, in 2005, NAC (Nanjing Automobile Corporation) offered 
5.3 million Pounds and successfully acquired famous British Automobile Company 
MG-Rover and its engine producing facilities. In the same year, Qianjiang Motor 
European Branch became the major share holder of Italian Benelli motor cycle company 
and transform it to a production base for high quality motor cycle exports. In 2007, 
SAIC (Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation) bought out Ricardo research joint 
venture and has become the key player in SAIC Motor UK Technical Center Limited. 
European car producing technology has been in the world’s cutting edge for decades. 
Acquiring European automobile manufacture is not only of great significance in 
stabilizing and exploring the local market, but also strengthens future risk resistance 
ability of Chinese automobile enterprises. Meanwhile, these acquisition operations let 
Chinese car makers gain the core technology of the acquire company and could apply it 
immediately to their own products. After acquisitions, SAIC and NAC both released 
new car models in European market, and were satisfied with the performances. 
 
 
2. Transportation Services 
 
Transportation service is the mainstay industry among Chinese state-owned enterprises 
FDI projects. China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), China Shipping Company, 
China National Aviation Holding Company (CNAH) all have large amount of FDI stock 
in EU nations. These transportation enterprises have demonstrated strong preference in 
choosing the investment mode. With no exceptions, they selected wholly owned as the 
major investment form. Take COSCO for example, among its 15 European branches, 12 
are wholly owned by COSCO. The investment mode selection here is closely linked 
with enterprises’ product attributes and their global and regional development strategies. 
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By gaining direct control over branches around the world, large MNEs in transportation 
industry will be able to maintain an advantageous position. 
 
 
3. Financial Industry 
 
Currently the four major Chinese commercial banks and PICC (the People’s Insurance 
Company of China) all have FDI operations in EU member states. At the beginning 
stage of investment, most of these financial institutes first set up wholly owned 
representative offices. After a period when the business network had been generally 
established, they on the one hand upgraded these representative offices to branches, and 
on the other hand, used Greenfield mode to create business branches in other region. 
M&A mode seems not much in use by banks. For example, Bank of China has owned 
six branches in EU, the most among all the Chinese state-owned banks.  
 
 
4. Electric Appliance 
 
At present, major state-owned electronic appliance producers who are participating in 
EU investment are TCL Corporation, Changhong Electric Corporation and Hisense.  
 
From the Table 6-2, we could see that TCL used M&A in Europe while the other two 
companies both chose Greenfield mode. TCL Corporations acquired Germany 
electronic company Schneider in 2002 and later in the early 2004 French Thomson, a 
leading electric appliance producer in EU. The reason for TCL’s expansion under M&A 
mode is to gain immediate access to foreign technology and internationally recognized 
brand.  
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In the year 2004, Hisense established a Greenfield joint venture in Hungary. One year 
later, another partly owned venture was built by Hisense in France. These two 
production bases mainly produce HD and LED high quality digital TV products. Its 
sales distribution network covers most of EU member states. In 2007, Changhong 
established its European base in Czech for electric appliance production. The initial 
investment injection was over 10 million US dollars, which was the largest Chinese FDI 
in Czech and also the first independently owned overseas production base in the history 
of Chinese electric appliance industry. These Greenfield FDI projects helped 
Changhong and Hisense to overstep EU trade barrier, avoid anti-dumping inspections, 
and most importantly integrated European market and fortified company 
competitiveness in Europe. So, in all, FDI projects of Changhong Electric Appliance 
and Hisense can be seen as successful cases. 
 
 
Table 6-2 Electric Appliance Industry Chinese State-owned Enterprises FDI 
Projects after 2001 
Enterprise Host Country Time FDI Entry Mode 
TCL Germany 2002 Wholly-owned M&A 
TCL France 2004 Wholly-owned M&A 
Hisense Hungary 2004 Partly-owned Greenfield 
Hisense France 2005 Greenfield 
Changhong Electric 
Corp 
Czech 2007 Wholly-owned Greenfield 
Source: Hisense official website: http://www.hisense.com and Changhong official website: 
http://www.changhong.com.cn/changhong/china/7920.htm  
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6.1.2  Specific Country Concentration Feature 
 
When several Chinese state-owned enterprises invest in the same country, their FDI 
entry modes are quite similar. The reason is that FDI mode choice is to a very large 
degree decided by the host country’s economic development level, foreign investment 
policies, and level of control over foreign investment. Evidence lies in the fact that 
when investing in new EU member states, China’s state-owned enterprises are in favour 
of Greenfield mode. M&A is preferred in FDI projects taken place in old EU member 
states. 
 
Chinese enterprises FDI modes used in Italy is a very typical example of country 
concentration feature. Before 2003, according to common practice of Italian official 
administrations (under the principle of reciprocity), Chinese companies were not 
allowed to establish wholly owned subsidiaries within Italy but had to co-operate with 
Italian firms and form joint ventures together or transfer the investment through other 
EU countries. As a consequence, when first entering Italian market, most Chinese 
enterprises used M&A mode. Later they began to gradually buy in all their stocks and 
turn back to wholly owned form. After 2003, new Italian investment policies granted 
permission for Chinese firms to establish wholly owned subsidiaries. By far the major 
FDI entry mode of Chinese FDI in Italy is wholly owned Greenfield. 
 
Another case indicating China’s state-owned enterprises FDI entry mode feature is 
about investing in UK. Before the year 2000, Chinese firms in UK all adopted 
Greenfield mode of entry, and they showed strong preference in wholly-owned 
ownership structure. Before establishment of official subsidiaries, Chinese enterprises 
normally set up representative offices. The function of representative office is to collect 
overseas market information and initialize contacts and business relationship with local 
market and firms in the meanwhile of seeking for co-operation opportunities. After three 
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to five years of preparation, some Chinese enterprises began to establish their 
subsidiaries in UK. This is partly due to the supervision of Chinese government on 
China’s state-owned enterprises overseas FDI activities. This also reflects Chinese firms’ 
general characteristics at the beginning stage of internationalization. The main function 
of early established representative offices and institutes is just an information window 
without clear competitiveness. 
 
 
6.1.3  Investment Strategy Concentration Feature 
 
Enterprises with similar investment strategies tend to be in favour of the same FDI entry 
mode. If an MNE has strong demand in the control power over its foreign subsidiaries, 
its FDI projects will definitely show a strong preference in acquiring stocks. Typical 
industries are transportation industry and financial industry. Enterprises looking for 
strategic reform will usually adopt M&A to offset their location limitation 
disadvantages. Convincing evidence is FDI projects of China Minmetals Corporation 
and CNBM (China National Building Material Group Corporation). 
 
On 1 June 2007, CNBM signed the contract and officially acquired Germany large-scale 
wind turbine blade producer NOI. Chinese wind power companies have been trapped 
technologically in design wind powered equipment. By using M&A investment mode, 
Chinese state-owned wind power firms could introduce, digest and absorb foreign 
advanced technology. CNBM official announced that after this international acquisition, 
CNBM would be able to realize its goal of transforming into a wind power industrial 
platform with R&D, design and production capability integrated. 
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6.1.4  Investment Stage Concentration Feature 
 
Some pioneer Chinese state-owned enterprises have already started to invest in Europe 
from 1980s. At early stage of investment, most of these firms used forms of 
representative office or agency, such as China Minmetals Corporation and China Ocean 
Shipping Corporation. After accumulating investment experience in the region and 
expanding business network, they began to establish subsidiaries. As Chinese 
state-owned enterprises began to locate their regional headquarters in Europe, which 
directly control and plan European business branch. By so far, China Minmetals Corp, 
COSCO, SINOCHEM (China Sinochem Group Corporation), SAIC, Hisense, 
Changhong Electric Corp, and China Telecom have all had European headquarter and 
established a whole systematic business network. 
 
Table 6-3 Part of Chinese State-owned Enterprises FDI Operation Statistics 
Time Investment Amount Acquirer Target Company 
May 2008 - China Minmetals HP Tec Germany 
July 2007 1.45 Billion GBP China Development Bank Barclay UK 
Jan 2007 - CNBM NOI Germany 
May 2005 3.5 Million DM HMCT KELCH Germany 
Nov 2001 615 Million USD ZOOMLION POWERMOLE 
UK 
Source: Websites of Economic and Commercial Counsellors’ Office of The Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the European Communities, HMCT, China Minmetals Corporation and ZOOMLION. 
 
 
In the new century, as the competitiveness of China’s state-owned enterprises is 
growing rapidly, an increasing number of cross-border M&A have taken place. A wider 
range of industries and larger amount of funding are involved in these international 
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M&A operations, as can been seen from the Table 6-3. On 27 November 2001, 
ZOOMLION (Changsha Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science & Technology 
Development Corporation) successfully acquired the world famous British trenchless 
machinery company POWERMOLE. This M&A case brought in 20-year more 
advanced technology for Chinese trenchless machinery firms and made ZOOMLION an 
internationally reputed MNE. It also greatly encouraged all Chinese state-owned 
enterprises seeking for outward investment. 
 
 
6.2  Framework of FDI Entry Mode Selection for Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises Investing in EU 
 
In order to offer optimum choice for Chinese state enterprise owners in selecting FDI 
entry mode to EU, the framework of entry mode should be able to cover all the 
advantages and special characteristics. Therefore, the following part will attempt to 
build linkages between Chinese state enterprises’ universality and uniqueness in 
deciding FDI entry mode. 
 
 
6.2.1  Optimum Entry Mode Selection Analysis: Based on CSOE Internal Factors 
 
Internal entry mode influencing factors of Chinese state enterprises need to take into 
account of advantage transfer start point factors (CSOE as ordinary enterprises) and 
their STRENGTHS (CSOE as special enterprises), as is shown in Table 6-4 in 
Appendix. 
 
Study and comparison of the elements from advantage transfer start point and 
STRENGTHS in the Table 6-4 gave us the inference that there are overlapping 
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concerning aspects about FDI entry mode influencing factors from both sides: concerns 
of sector advantage, technology demand, natural resource demand, EU investment 
experience, and expansion strategy. These concerns are the fundamental controllers 
during entry mode decision making process. Consequently it gives the paper reasoning 
backup in further investigating the choice of FDI entry mode and building up of the 
final framework. 
 
 
1. When investing in EU, Chinese state-owned enterprises in machinery, textile, light 
industry and electric appliance sectors should adopt wholly-owned Greenfield or 
partly-owned Greenfield investment mode. 
 
High level of competition has already existed within these sectors in China, which 
drives these national companies to shift their attention to the outside world. As Chinese 
Yuan has been appreciating against Euro, EU market entry barrier seems getting 
increasingly difficult to overstep for Chinese exporters. Producing and selling directly 
from inside the target market is becoming an alternative trend for Chinese light 
industrial manufacturers. With the aim of transferring their product advantage to outside 
markets, China’s state-owned enterprises are seeking for opportunities to own producing 
base in EU member states. Greenfield investment mode may serve as a good choice for 
their first investment. At present, Chinese electric appliance firms have already set up 
production factories in France, Czech, Hungary and etc. Most of these overseas 
factories have been so far functioning well and can be used as live successful 
investment examples for other investors. 
 
Although the number of China’s state-owned enterprises investing in new EU members 
is small, what can be predicted is that FDI of Chinese manufacturing industry in the 
region will inevitably increase. Establishing overseas factories and production bases 
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will be the main focus in the long run. From the ownership aspect, wholly-owned 
investment mode will be the dominant trend. This is because the electric appliance 
industry has reached a status of saturation, which in at the stage of maturity in the 
product’s cycle. Chinese state-owned enterprises in these industries possess capabilities 
of producing high standard products and therefore their aim is to explore foreign 
markets rather than to obtain foreign technology. Under wholly-owned investment mode, 
transfer of technology, knowledge and management advantages can be internalized. If 
there is restriction in FDI equity holdings, Chinese state manufacturing enterprises 
could use partly-owned Greenfield mode. 
 
 
2. It is wise for technology and innovation oriented Chinese government enterprises to 
enter EU under M&A form. 
 
One of the most important motives for Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in EU 
is the urgent demand for advanced technology, distribution channel and management 
experience. Normally two ways are available in accessing to these assets. One way is to 
directly acquire the technology of the target. Another way is to move into an advanced 
technology and management concentrated cluster area. With such clusters, MNEs can 
use the experts inside to train the employees of their own company, in order to get 
accessed to the desired expertise and technology and further obtain independent R&D 
capability. Traditional EU member states can be ‘the cluster’ here as they are generally 
advanced technology holders. Therefore M&A entry mode of FDI is a proper method 
under these markets. By adopting M&A, Chinese state-owned enterprises could 
combine EU strong points of advanced technology and an open, integrated market with 
other benefits like time saving and lower entry barrier and risks. 
 
In addition, R&D oriented FDI is becoming a trend of investment mode for China’s 
83 
 
state-owned enterprises under the world’s globalization background. M&A FDI of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises has been used as a typical and successful example of 
catch-up investment strategy, which greatly promoted the enthusiasm of Chinese firms. 
Firms of automobile and motor cycle industries have already had M&A cases with R&D 
institutes in EU. Moreover electric appliance sector also saw the establishment of 
Chinese R&D centres. Acquisition of European R&D institutes could reward parent 
companies of quick involvement in product and technology’s R&D as well as previous 
research achievement and experienced experts. This is a big step forward in building a 
systematic enterprise structure for Chinese state-owned firms on an international level. 
If no R&D institutes are available or are not able to meet the technology demand, 
Chinese state-owned enterprises may begin with establishing R&D department of 
smaller scales. Many European countries like Austria, Denmark, Italy, and UK have 
special offers in attracting FDI for R&D operations. France and Ireland use favourable 
tax policies in calling for R&D investment. So if China’s state-owned enterprises could 
make full use of these friendly investment policies, they will be able to make better 
decision in choosing the most appropriate FDI entry mode. 
 
 
3. Partly-owned M&A mode would benefit Chinese state enterprises with the aim of 
access to foreign natural resource reserves for risk diversion and fast entry. 
 
Natural resource oriented type of outward investment has been an emphasis of China’s 
FDI activities. Access to foreign natural resource could offset the lack of certain natural 
resource situation in China and consequently make great contribution in economic 
development. However, most countries have strict restrictions in natural resource 
exploration as is mentioned previously. So it is very unlikely that either Greenfield or 
wholly owned investment mode could easily apply to the energy sector. On the contrary, 
M&A or partly owned mode has turned out to be very practical. Firms of energy sector 
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are usually huge-scale in assets and financing foundation. They are bearing much higher 
risks and expecting long term development cycles. M&A and joint venture modes allow 
participating Chinese companies to share the large amount of input for natural resource 
exploration, and further more establish a stable and trusted co-operation relationship 
with the host country. Once the long-term relationship is established, it will be easier for 
firms from both sides to hedge risks and maintain stable supply of available resource. 
 
In addition, many enterprises of EU member states are stock holders of natural resource 
exploration firms in many other countries and even some large natural resource 
development projects in developing countries. Collaborating or acquiring these EU 
enterprises is also an indirect way of gaining access to natural resource in other regions. 
Wide participation in exploring natural resource across countries will be of great 
strategic significance in the long run. 
 
 
4. Chinese state-owned enterprises with more EU investment experience would prefer 
the mode of Greenfield. By accumulating investment experience, firms can make more 
accurate development plans for themselves. Moreover, rich experience helps them to 
gain a better understanding of European economy, society, and culture. They will also 
become much more familiar with investment laws and regulations, standard procedure 
in investment operations. Thus, they will gain and demonstrate an overall advantage in 
independent production and management. However, due to the fact that the majority of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises are in short of EU investment experience, M&A entry 
mode is demonstrating its attraction to most Chinese government-controlled firms when 
they go global and to EU. 
 
 
5. From global investment strategy perspective, Chinese state-owned enterprises with 
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globalisation development strategies are recommended to employ wholly-owned 
Greenfield, which emphasizes the control power of parent companies in order to 
achieve optimum energy coordination and allocation as well as the synergy of all 
subsidiaries around the globe. On the other side, those Chinese state firms with 
localization strategies would be advised to use partly-owned M&A. This type of entry 
mode combination features enterprises in quick response to changes in local markets. 
Partly-owned M&A also means more power allowed and decentralized to local 
subsidiary companies, and thereafter, smoothes their business relation network 
unfolding with local suppliers, clients and governments. 
 
 
6.2.2  Optimum Entry Mode Selection Analysis: Based on CSOE External Factors 
 
Similarly to CSOE internal factors discussed above, external entry mode influencing 
factors of Chinese state enterprises are consisted of  advantage transfer end point 
factors (CSOE as ordinary enterprises) and their OPPORTUNITIES (CSOE as special 
enterprises), which can be seen in Table 6-5. 
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Table 6-5  External entry mode influencing factors of CSOE in EU 
External entry mode influencing factors of CSOE in EU 
Advantage Transfer End Point Factors Opportunities 
1.EU investment related laws, policies 
and regulations 
2.Level of Economic Development and 
Marketization 
3.Quality of Infrastructure in EU 
4.Social and Cultural Background of 
Europe 
5.Local Partner 
6.Influencing Factors from Inside China 
1. Benefit from Chinese growing economy, 
sufficient financial backup. 
2.Global financial crisis forces some foreign 
companies to sell assets at low prices. 
3. Deepening of globalization; lower trade 
barriers after joining WTO. 
4. Offsetting the pressure of trade surplus 
and growing foreign reserves, and stress of 
Yuan appreciation. 
5. Overseas Chinese ensuring Chinese 
firms’ quick adaptation. 
 
 
The integration of external entry mode influencing factors intend to answer the question: 
Go to emerging markets of new members or traditional EU members? 
 
In the current investment stage, the most obvious and crucial motive of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises in EU is to obtain either advanced technological and managerial 
expertise or brand effect. As most high-tech and advanced managerial clusters are 
concentrated mostly in traditional EU powers, M&A is becoming an increasingly 
predominant form of FDI entry used by Chinese state-owned firms in Western European 
countries. Cultural difference further contributes to Chinese investors’ choice of M&A 
as it helps Chinese firms to get familiar with local culture starting from their partners. 
 
Emerging economies in EU, nevertheless, have their own unique attractions for Chinese 
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state enterprises. In comparison with that in traditional EU powers, production and 
operation costs in new EU members are cheaper and entry barriers are lower. The region 
can be taken as a starting point for integrating the whole European market. If we take all 
these factors into account, together with the friendly investment policies, it is safe to 
arrive at the conclusion that for Chinese state-owned enterprises, new EU member states 
have the most potential for Greenfield projects. One of the reasons is due to historical 
similarities. Many of new EU member states transformed from socialist economies and 
therefore have a closer psychological distance with Chinese culture. 
 
The idea of first investing in new EU member states and expanding after, however, is 
not perfect. Economic and political instability of some markets may expose investing 
bodies to risks. Some countries may have restrictions on company asset holdings.With 
these concerns, Chinese state-owned firms should think of entering with M&A mode. 
M&A here will be a wise strategy in helping developing the host country and eventually 
achieve win-win outcomes. Only through sincere willingness of cooperation and 
positive participation, Chinese state-owned enterprises could be accepted in the local 
market.  
 
 
6.2.3  Final Framework Integration 
 
After conducting a comprehensive analysis of FDI entry mode concerns, we could 
propose a final framework of FDI entry mode selection for Chinese state-owned 
enterprises investing in EU, as is demonstrated in Table 6-6. 
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Table 6-6  Framework of FDI entry mode selection for Chinese state-owned 
enterprises investing in EU 
Entry Modes Greenfield M&A 
Wholly-owned 
CSOEs of globalisation 
development strategies 
----- 
Partly-owned 
(joint venture) 
----- 
1. Natural resource oriented 
CSOEs 
2. CSOEs of localization 
development strategies 
Either wholly or 
partly owned 
1. CSOEs of manufacturing 
Sectors (machinery, textile, light 
industry and electric appliance) 
2. CSOEs of rich EU investment 
experience 
3. CSOE investing in Eastern 
Europe 
1. Technology and innovation 
oriented CSOEs; Brand 
effect oriented CSOEs 
2. CSOEs investing in 
Western Europe 
 
 
In general, FDI entry mode selection for Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in 
EU is a process of considering the influencing controllers above. The optimum entry 
mode choice is based on the following suggestions in brief: 
 
1. Chinese state-owned enterprises in machinery, textile, light industry and electric 
appliance sectors should take wholly-owned Greenfield or partly-owned Greenfield 
investment when entering EU market. 
 
2. Technology, innovation, and brand effect oriented Chinese government enterprises 
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are advised to go under M&A. 
 
3. Chinese state enterprises with the aim of access to foreign natural resource reserves 
could be most benefited from partly-owned M&A entry mode. 
 
4. Chinese state-owned enterprises with more EU investment experience are in 
advantageous positions in employing Greenfield. 
 
5. Chinese state-owned enterprises with globalisation development strategies are 
recommended to employ wholly-owned Greenfield while Chinese state firms with 
localization strategies would be advised to use partly-owned M&A 
 
6. Chinese state-owned enterprises with purposes to gain access to Western European 
high-tech clusters should adopt M&A; other state-owned enterprises with gradual 
expansion strategy should go Greenfield in EU emerging markets. 
 
 
6.2.4  Potential Challenges and Reacting Solutions: Based on WT Study 
 
Similarly to the logic of positive FDI influencing contributor selection, we need to see 
challenges that might be aroused from Chinese state-owned enterprises’ weaknesses and 
external threats, and how to overcome these potential challenges. Table 6-7 is a 
summary of previous outcomes from Chinese state-owned enterprises SWOT study, on 
negative side WT. 
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Table 6-7 Potential Challenges of Chinese state-owned enterprises (WT study) 
Weaknesses (W) Threats (T) Concerning Aspects 
Ownership ambiguity 
Integration difficulty, 
Cultural difference 
Structural Defect Insecure image ‘China Threat’ 
Low efficiency 
Low competition pressure 
Bureaucracy,  
Capital escape 
Short of EU investment 
experience and high-class 
employees 
Lack of experience and 
experts 
Low level of 
internationalization 
More policy incentives needed 
Foreign MNE 
competitors 
External challenges 
 
 
As we could see from Table 6-7, the negative impacts derived from Chinese 
state-owned enterprises’ weaknesses and threats are primarily concerning three aspects: 
structural defect, low level of internationalization, and external challenges. 
 
Challenges such as ownership ambiguity, insecure image, and inefficiency are mainly 
rooted in the structural defect of Chinese state-owned enterprise. Apart from pushing 
support, the presence of government influence on the other hand brings in bureaucracy 
and conflict possibility culturally and politically. Former investing operations initiated 
by resource seeking Chinese state-owned enterprise are good examples in demonstrating 
Chinese firms’ disadvantages. Defect from ownership structure, as a clearly special 
characteristic, is nearly impossible to be changed. However, there are still feasible 
solutions in diluting the displeasure that it may cause. When Chinese government 
officials are looking for overseas investment opportunities, especially in fields of 
strategic energy and technology, medium state enterprises or even private firms with 
91 
 
outstanding record might also be good alternatives for large-scale state-owned 
enterprises. Their smaller size and lower level of connection to Beijing would on the 
one hand offset the negative influence from ‘China threat’ among foreign government, 
and on the other hand would reinforce them with strong sense of improving market 
competitiveness and surviving foreign competitors. 
 
In additional to structural defect, low level of internationalization has been another 
reason for Chinese state-owned enterprises’ potential challenges during investing in EU. 
It is reflected as shortage of investment experience and employees of expertise widely 
among Chinese government companies. Therefore, before making decision on market 
entry, Chinese investors should first consult with reliable consulting firms and try to 
make accurate assessment over the prospective FDI projects. 
 
Last but not least, challenges caused by external factors should also been treated with 
proper reactions. As many foreign competitors of Chinese state-owned enterprises are 
internationally monopolistic firms, it will be wise for Chinese government to provide 
further policy support not only for large-scale state enterprises but also medium and 
small size government-controlled firms in order to ensure positive outcomes of 
state-owned companies’ overseas activities. Besides favourable policies and regulations 
on trade, finance and taxation, central and local government may use other tools in 
backing up state owned enterprises, for instance, providing timely investment 
information, technology support, and overseas investment risk insurance aid. 
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6.3  Avoiding Mistakes during Entry Mode Decision Making Process, TCL Case 
Study 
 
 
6.3.1  Company Introduction and Case Background14
As a leading television manufacture and a lion share holder of Chinese television 
market, TCL had its technique and product quality recognized by OEM contracts with 
internationally famous companies such as Philips, Toshiba and Bang & Olufsen. For the 
reason of import quotas and high tariffs, however, TCL did not find good ways to enter 
European and North American markets. Nonetheless, in many occasions, the Chairman 
and CEO of TCL Li Dongsheng, representing TCL management, had voiced TCL’s goal 
to ‘become a Chinese Sony or Samsung’
 
 
TCL Corporation (known as TCL) is a multinational electronic appliance producer 
based in Huizhou, China. When the company was first established in 1981, it was a 
small-scale producer of cassette tapes. It transformed into a mass electronic products 
provider by expanding its business to telephone in 1985 and television in 1992. After 
years of effort, TCL made itself widely recognized as the largest state-owned television 
manufacturer in China and also a joint venture with several Hong Kong investors. 
Today TCL has distribution channels throughout the world and sells electronic products 
under four brands. 
 
15
In order to circumvent Europe’s barriers of import quotas, in 2002 TCL made its bold 
move in Germany by acquiring the insolvent Schneider Electronics, which is a veteran 
television manufacture, for € 8 million. The purchase included equipment, stocks, 
technology and brand of Schneider Electronics. To TCL, the most valuable asset of 
. 
 
                                                          
14Source of case data: The Risk Analysis of TCL Merger and Acquisition Thomson Company. By TengHai. 
15“The Struggle of the Champions,” Economist, January 8, 2005, 57–59. 
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Schneider Electronics is its brand and the brand recognition value. According to the 
contract however, production activity of Schneider is to continue for at least two more 
years. This actually means that TCL will have to wait for a rather long period in 
transforming Schneider assets to its own advantages. 
 
Later in 2003, ambitious TCL investors saw their next opportunity in Europe. French 
television manufacturer Thomson Electronics, who suffered financial setbacks, was 
seeking for partners to resuscitate its business. As Thomson is also the owner of the 
well-known brand RCA in the United States, TCL managers believed that this would be 
their best chance to breach trade barriers of European and North American markets 
simultaneously. 
 
TCL formed strategic alliance with Thomson and together they established 
TCL-Thomson Electronics (TTE), the world’s largest television manufacturer, where 
TCL owned 67% of its shares. This marked one major leap forward of TCL in exploring 
overseas market. It also helped Li Dongsheng win the respect of industry leaders and 
media. Fortune Magazine even named him as ‘Asian Businessman of the Year’ for 2003. 
The merger gave TCL access to Thomson’s labour and distribution channels in France 
as well as its production facilities in other markets. In addition, agreement for the use of 
common designs for chassis and chipsets was confirmed. With these valuable resources 
achieved through merger, management executives of both sides touted the improved 
production efficiency and international influence of the joint venture. 
 
Before TCL investors began to realize that they were far too optimistic about the 
outcomes of foreign investment, unfortunately, they switched their attention to the 
mobile phone arm of Alcatel, another unprofitable brand. Alcatel was the world’s largest 
supplier of broadband Internet equipment. In August 2004, TCL and Alcatel formed a 
$110 million joint venture where TCL held a 55% stake of it. The newly created firm 
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allowed TCL to strive into vast European market of mobile phone manufacturing and 
vending. Yet this international marriage proved to be short-lived, for even less than one 
year. Citing reasons of losses ($45.7 million in first quarter 2005) and management 
discord, Alcatel managements finally decided to back out of the joint venture and 
eventually sold all of its stake to TCL in May 2005. As one Alcatel senior executive 
lamented, ‘the cultural differences between the two companies were huge … there was 
no synergy at all.’16
Meanwhile, ambitious Chinese investors did not hear much good news of the 
TCL-Thomson Electronics as its profitability status looked so bad that it even dragged 
down TCL’s own performance. TCL’s net profits fell by half in 2004 to $41 million. 
TCL’s CFO Yan admitted on the one-year anniversary of the strategic alliance, ‘in the 
past months of operations, we found out the challenges and difficulties are deeper than 
we thought.’
 
 
17
As a Chinese state-owned enterprise, TCL produces electric appliance (televisions and 
telephones) as main products. In the M&A case of TCL with French Thomson, TCL 
selected partly-owned M&A as FDI entry mode to EU. The key incentive is the 
core-technology and brand recognition effect of Thomson in Europe. TCL’s 
development strategy is localization in EU. Before the M&A deal took place in 2003, 
 TCL officers announced a surprising loss of $12.4 million during the 
first half of the year 2005. $42 loss caused by Thomson’s operation in the United States 
and Europe made up a major part of the deficit. As a consequence, the original plan of 
making TTE profitable by 2005 was pushed back by two years to 2007. 
 
 
6.3.2  TCL Entry Mode Selection Using the Framework and Analysis of the 
Investment Failure with French Thomson 
 
                                                          
16 Wu, F., (2005), The Globalization of Corporate China, NBR Analysis. 16(3) 
17 Wu, F., (2005), The Globalization of Corporate China, NBR Analysis. 16(3) 
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TCL’s last and first investment is with German Schneider Electronics in 2002. So TCL 
should be regarded as an enterprise without sufficient EU investment experience. 
Investment projects took place in France, Western Europe. These are the basic facts 
needed in employing the FDI entry mode framework proposed in this paper. Now we 
have a table indicating the Framework suggested entry mode combination and the mode 
TCL used in reality. 
 
Table 6-8 Comparison of Entry Mode Choice between Framework Theoretical 
Inference and TCL’s Actual Choice 
TCL’s Facts and Investment 
Influencing Factors 
Theoretical Entry 
Mode Suggested 
Same (√) or Difference () With 
The Actual Choice of Entry 
Mode (M&A) 
Sector: Electric Appliance Greenfield X 
Motive: Technology-oriented, 
Brand effect 
M&A √ 
Strategy: Localization M&A √ 
Location: France,Western 
Europe 
M&A √ 
Experience: Insufficient 
Experience 
M&A √ 
 
 
From the table above, we could see the choices of FDI entry mode are mostly the same 
between theoretical results and actual choice. As an electronic appliance producer, TCL 
did not choose Greenfield but M&A in its investment in France. This seems to 
contradict the outcomes of the Framework, but in this case, TCL’s main purpose or 
motive is to obtain Thomson’s technology and brand. This is different from most of 
other electric appliance investors whose aims are to merely expand markets. 
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Failure of TCL’s investment could be summarized as two aspects. 
 
 
Inaccurate Expectation of Target Company and Market 
 
Decisions of FDI entry mode selection is usually on the basis of a prospective growth 
rate of the target market. But in practice, the real rate of growth may turn out to be 
different from what has been expected before investment. Huge difference between the 
predicted market volume and the real market growth rate would lead to the wrong 
choice of investment entry mode and eventually failure of the entire project. For 
instance, if a company only sees the big European market without recognizing the real 
target group of customers, there is a high possibility that growth rate of market be 
predicted overoptimistically. This will definitely harm the company’s practical 
performance. So during the FDI entry mode decision making stage, state-owned 
enterprises should make use of their advantages in collecting and processing market 
information and be scientific in evaluating future trend of the market. 
 
Regarding cross-border M&A operations, highly influential international consulting 
firms have already been brought in by investing enterprises. These consulting firms 
offer reliable data source and former investment experiences. They are also familiar 
with foreign laws and policies and could make detailed and feasible plans. In order to 
have a precise grasp of the market situation during decision making process, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises should collaborate with reliable consulting firms. 
 
In this case, TCL did not go to consult with any internationally famous consulting firms, 
and this, as a result, led to inaccurate expectations and the loss after. Besides, not only 
was there a vast difference in management styles of the two companies, but also the 
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acquired European firms were financially distressed and turned out to be less 
technologically-advanced than expected, especially in the area of flat-screen technology. 
 
 
Insufficient Power of International Operation and Post-deal Integration 
 
Inaccurate expectation of target company and market further led TCL into difficulties 
post-deal integrations. In the case of the TCL-Thomson failed joint-venture, one 
Thomson senior executive lamented, ‘the cultural differences between the two 
companies were huge … there was no synergy at all.’ 
 
For MNEs, entry mode of FDI decision making takes place at the beginning stage of the 
investment operation though, it may cause decisive impact over the entire overseas 
process. Project managers and key personnel nominated should be patriotic, responsible, 
and dedicated to his or her job. Ordinary employees should better be recruited from 
locals in order to make good use of human resource. Localization management strategy 
is gaining popularity in recent years. Therefore, when making decisions on FDI entry 
mode selection, investors will need to assess the international operation power of the 
company. By company operation power here, it mainly includes the parent company’s 
independent operation power, operational power of the newly built company, and the 
change of such power after integration with other firms. It is a complex of all business 
factors on both internal and external, economic and political aspects. Chinese 
state-owned enterprise managers should pay special attention to their firms’ operation 
power after integrating with European companies with rich cultural background. 
Besides, international operation experience of European firms cannot be copied simply 
by moving experienced experts to new investment projects.  
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6.4  M&A, An Increasingly Popular FDI Entry Mode among Chinese State-owned 
Enterprises, MG-Rover Acquisition Case Study 
 
 
6.4.1  Case Background 
 
MG-Rover was the last domestically owned mass-production automobile manufacture 
in the UK. The company was established in the year 2000 when the Phoenix 
Consortium obtained the car-making and engine manufacturing assets of the original 
Rover Group from BMW. The following is a case about two Chinese state-owned 
automobile enterprises’ M&A operation with Rover. 
 
Enter EU market has been a wish for Chinese car makers for a long time, but very few 
actually did it. Reaching EU automobile quality standard proved to be too 
time-consuming for Chinese automobile players, most of who lacked the advanced 
technology in car quality and safety design but was impatient to cut a share in this 
world’s richest market. Therefore, acquiring European automobile firms’ technology 
and brands through merger and acquisition came to be a short cut in their sight. 
 
In June 2004, the famous UK automobile brand MG Rover announced to establish a 
joint venture with its newly developed overseas business partner, named SAIC. SAIC is 
the abbreviation of Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise. SAIC and MG Rover agreed to become allied to develop new models and 
technology with their joint effort. An even more encouraging piece of news broke out 
that the two companies had arrived at agreement of producing a million cars a year, with 
the production shared between MG Rover’s Longbridge site and locations in China. 
SAIC were to invest £1 billion in exchange of 70% of the joint venture’s total stake 
while MG Rover owning the rest 30%. However, the later cooperation did not always 
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go pleasant as before. Though SAIC successfully obtained the design and property 
rights for the Rover 25 and Rover 75 in early 2005, it subsequently lost out to another 
Chinese state-owned competitor, Nanjing Automobile Corporation (NAC), in a bidding 
for the use of MG Rover brand names and production facilities in Europe. Later in 2006, 
NAC forwarded its buying strategy with MG Rover by taking over its key assets. They 
also restarted MG sports car and sports saloon production in the year followed. With the 
technology obtained from MG Rover, SAIC developed its own brand Roewe in a few 
years later and put it into Chinese car market in 2006. However, NAC seems to be an 
even bigger winner in this case as it has made the acquisition deal closed successfully. 
After acquiring the famous Rover brand, NAC is able to use it as a base in Europe to 
build upon. 
 
 
6.4.2  Rationale and Implications 
 
Rationale behind the MG-Rover M&A case seems to be in the same logic with the entry 
mode framework provided in this paper. Both of the two Chinese state-owned 
automobile firms are very actively involved in M&A entry mode in EU. Although SAIC 
and NAC have different ways of utilizing the assets acquired, the logic behind their 
buying behaviour is the same: to gain immediate access of technology and existing 
brand. Acquisition would give them access not only to a target-company’s products, but 
also to its technical knowledge, technology, brand and customer base. Automobile 
industry in China, at this point, is still on the early stage of international FDI process. 
Unlike foreign first-class automobile giants, Chinese government-owned carmakers do 
not possess core technological and brand advantages on a global scale. Chinese cars are 
characterized by cheap prices and low safety standards. Therefore, automobile 
manufacturers in China are keen in finding shortcuts in improving their products and 
technology. M&A entry mode has no doubt presented the most quick way in realizing 
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their goals. 
 
Also, we should see Chinese government’s role in facilitating the deal. The central 
government wants auto exports to increase substantially from 2005, and China’s share 
of the global vehicle trade to climb to 10% between 2020 and 2035. Towards that end, it 
is helping automakers with funding—for example, by giving low-interest loans to 
Nanjing Automobile and SAIC to buy shares in the assets of MG Rover. The 
government is also introducing beneficial policies—for example, it will require 
automakers to apply for export licences from January 2007 onwards. This is intended to 
prevent undercutting on prices as China’s domestic automakers export their vehicles 
because of over-production at home. 
 
M&A case with MG-Rover initiated by SAIC and NAC is one of the successful ones. 
Both state-owned enterprises have benefited from their overseas FDI and transformed 
the technology obtained. This partly explained why M&A FDI entry mode has become 
increasingly popular for Chinese state-owned enterprises with urgent technology and 
brand recognition demand. However, whether SAIC (and NAC)18
                                                          
18 NAC was later acquired by SAIC in 2007. The MG-Rover brand has subsequently become part of 
SAIC asset. 
 could completely 
absorb the technology and further make Rover profitable is yet unknown. Results can be 
only seen years later. But the merger of SAIC and NAC is very likely to form a solid 
foundation state-owned enterprise (largest Chinese automobile producer) of satisfying 
technology absorptive capability. However, the post-deal integration threat remains to 
be a potential problem in this case. For other technology demand government 
enterprises, accurate evaluation on M&A opportunity and post-deal integration risks 
should be carefully looked through before making entry mode decisions. 
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6.5  Conclusion of Chapter 
 
Chapter Six, together with Chapter Four and Chapter Five, is a process of building a 
framework of FDI entry mode selection for Chinese state-owned enterprises. This 
chapter serves as the final integration part. It first examined features of current FDI 
entry mode used by Chinese government firms in EU. Then with reference to the 
previously selected influencing factors, the paper built the final entry mode framework 
with an emphasis of combinations of enterprises’ advantage transfer start point factors 
and STRENGTHS, and advantage transfer end point factors and OPPORTUNITIES. 
Then cases of TCL Electronics and SAIC and NAC’s acquisition with MG-Rover are 
used to illustrate potential threats during the FDI operation and M&A as an increasingly 
popular entry form for Chinese government investors. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
Under the general background of Chinese enterprises FDI in EU, although not in large 
scale, the total amount of investment appears to be growing rapidly. As the main force 
in the foreign investment activities, Chinese state-owned enterprises have the longest 
investment history, most experience and the largest scale among Chinese investing 
bodies. The issue of investment entry mode selection has been regarded as one of the 
most important questions that all investors need to answer during decision making 
process. Therefore, study of FDI entry mode selection is of great importance for 
entrepreneurs and investors. This paper takes China’s state-owned enterprises as 
research target and set the main focus,or investment location, on EU member states. 
 
Based on existing literature and FDI entry mode theories, this paper introduced the 
present FDI status of Chinese state-owned enterprises in EU and discussed FDI entry 
mode influencing factors from two angles: CSOE as ordinary firms and as special 
government enterprises.The paper used qualitative research methodology and SWOT 
analysis method to examine the factors which influence China’s state-owned enterprises 
FDI in EU entry mode choices by building up a framework for the selection of possible 
FDI entry mode candidates. Main findings of this paper are as follows: 
 
1. During the study on China’s state-owned enterprises FDI entry mode selection, four 
features of Chinese firms’ FDI modes are found in this paper. These features can be 
summarized as specific industry concentration feature, specific country 
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concentration feature, investment strategy concentration feature, and investment 
stage concentration feature 
 
2. Under the framework of foreign direct investment theories, this chapter treated 
Chinese state enterprises as ordinary MNEs and attempted to categorize possible 
FDI influencing factors into two groups: advantage transfer start point factors and 
advantage transfer end factors. The paper put Chinese state-owned enterprises into 
standard entry mode influencing factor selection procedure and analyzed potential 
influencing factors from both internal and external sides in detail. 
 
3. With a strong reference to the special characteristics of China’s state enterprises, this 
paper adopted SWOT analysis method in examining the potential FDI entry mode 
influencing contributors derived from the uniqueness that is different from other 
reglar companies. 
 
4. The paper built up a FDI entry mode selection framework for Chinese state-owned 
enterprises investing in EU. The framework provided suggestions for Chinese 
entrepreneurs on clues of finding the optimum combination of FDI entry mode in 
Europe. Indications from the framework are: 
 
A. Chinese state-owned enterprises in machinery, textile, light industry and electric 
appliance sectors should take wholly-owned Greenfield or partly-owned 
Greenfield investment when entering EU market. 
B. Technology, innovation, and brand effect oriented Chinese government 
enterprises are advised to go under M&A. 
C. Chinese state enterprises with the aim of access to foreign natural resource 
reserves could be most benefited from partly-owned M&A entry mode. 
D. Chinese state-owned enterprises with more EU investment experience are in 
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advantageous positions in employing Greenfield. 
E. Chinese state-owned enterprises with globalisation development strategies are 
recommended to employ wholly-owned Greenfield while Chinese state firms 
with localization strategies would be advised to use partly-owned M&A 
F. Chinese state-owned enterprises with purposes to gain access to Western 
European high-tech clusters should adopt M&A; other state-owned enterprises 
with gradual expansion strategy should go Greenfield in EU emerging markets. 
 
 
The paper and the framework are not without limitations. First, the framework is based 
on macro-level analysis and is able to provide a basic structure of reasoning for Chinese 
state-owned enterprises as a whole party or a specific sector. But on micro-level, the 
framework has its limitation in predicting the actual decision made by specific 
companies. Second, though enjoying a rocketing growth, China’s FDI flow to EU 
initiated by state-owned enterprises consists only a small part of China’s entire FDI. 
Number of the existing investing Chinese state enterprises in Europe has limited the 
research to be conducted on a quantitative basis. 
 
The selection of FDI entry mode for Chinese state-owned Enterprises investing in EU is 
a complex issue. This paper attempted to make contributions to the investigation of 
entry mode selection by building a macro-level framework for Chinese state enterprises. 
Further research on this topic in the future could be advanced from perspectives of some 
specific sector. 
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Table 3-1 Comparison of Greenfield and M&A 
 
Aspects of Comparison M&A Greenfield 
Investment Process 
Range of Target Industry 
Selection 
Technology and capital concentrated industries 
High entry & exit barrier industries 
All industries 
Investment Cycle (Timeliness 
of Operation) 
Good, requires less time Requires a preparing period 
Financing Structure Flexible, less input, various forms Simplex, requires large amount of input 
Risk Control Higher risk Lower risk 
Investment Environment of 
the Host Country 
More independent from the host country influence Easier to be influenced by host country factors 
Costs and Returns 
Costs Lower costs Higher costs 
Returns Higher returns Lower returns 
Time Factor in Acquiring 
Strategic Resource 
Faster access to strategic resource Slower access to strategic resource 
Influence to the 
Host Country 
Macro-Economic Influence 
Less support from locals, may not much enlarge 
local economy size, more potential collaborations 
More support from locals, positive effect to local 
economy; may result in overlapping and redundancy 
Micro-Economic Influence Maintain competition level Possibility of a higher level of competition 
 Table 3-2 Comparison of Wholly-owned Firm and Joint Venture 
 
Aspects of Comparison Wholly-owned Firm Joint Venture 
Control Power More control power Less control power 
Required Investment Size Larger Smaller 
Risk Exposure Higher risk Lower risk 
Investor Size Larger Smaller 
Market Reaction Flexibility Faster Slower 
Level of Classification Higher level of classification Lower level of classification 
Influence from Host Country Less support from locals More support from locals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-1 China’s State-owned Enterprises FDI to EU Entry Mode Selection 
 Year Investment Enterprise Sector Mode of Entry Target Company/ New Project Host Country 
1 2001 ZOOMLION Machinery Manufacturing M&A POWERMOLE UK UK 
2 2002 TCL Electric Appliance M&A Schneider Electronics Germany 
3 2003 China Minmetals Energy Greenfield Minmetals Spain Co Ltd Spain 
4 2004 Hisense Electric Appliance Greenfield TV Production Base Hungary Hungary 
5 2004 TCL Electric Appliance M&A Thomson France 
6 2005 Hisense Electric Appliance Greenfield Production Base France France 
7 2005 HMCT 1 Machinery Manufacturing  M&A KELCH Germany Germany 
8 2005 NAC Automobile M&A MG-Rover UK UK 
9 2005 Qianjiang Motor Automobile M&A Benelli Italy Italy 
10 2006 China Telecom Telecom Greenfield China Telecom (Europe) Corp UK 
11 2006 WISCO2 Iron and Steel  Greenfield WISCO Europe Trade Corp Germany 
12 2006 NBE3 Electricity  Greenfield NBE Sweden Co Ltd Sweden 
13 2007 Changhong Electric Electric Appliance Greenfield Production Base Czech Czech 
14 2007 SAIC Automobile M&A Ricardo 2010 UK UK 
15 2007 CNBM Building Materials M&A NOI Germany Germany 
16 2007 China Development Bank Finance M&A Barclay UK UK 
17 2007 Hisense Electric Appliance Greenfield Hisense European R&D Center Netherlands 
18 2008 China Minmetals Energy M&A HP Tec Germany Germany 
19 2009 Sinopec Group Energy M&A Addax Switzerland/Canada 
                                                          
1 HMCT: Harbin Measuring and Cutting Tool Group Corporation 
2 WISCO: Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation 
3 NBE: National Bio Energy Co., Ltd. 
 Table 5-4  SWOT Analysis of Chinese State-owned Enterprises Investing in EU 
 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
1. Chinese government support; broad 
vision; high risk tolerance. 
2. Sector advantage; privileges to 
operate in certain concessionary and 
sensitive industries; legitimate 
monopoly; aid support after setbacks. 
3. Monopolistic position in market; 
strong risk resistance capability. 
4. Favourable policy preference. 
5. Easy access to finance; strong and 
stable push to commercial development. 
6. Easier to secure market positions and 
nice credit standing. 
1. Ambiguous bound between rights, 
obligations and interest distribution; hard 
to be bound with normal Civil Law. 
2. ‘Insecure image’; possibility of 
political interference. 
3. Lack of EU investment experience, 
international management skills, and 
high-class employees. 
4. More FDI incentives policies needed. 
5. Low financial efficiency; huge loss in 
overseas investment. 
6. High exit barriers; reduce of 
competition pressure; less possibility of 
restructuring. 
1. Benefit from Chinese growing 
economy, sufficient financial backup. 
2. Global financial crisis forces some 
foreign companies to sell assets at 
low prices. 
3. Deepening of globalization; lower 
trade barriers after joining WTO. 
4. Offsetting the pressure of trade 
surplus and growing foreign reserves, 
and stress of Yuan appreciation. 
5. Overseas Chinese ensuring 
Chinese firms’ quick adaptation. 
1. Lack of overseas 
investment experience and 
managerial experts. 
2. Integration difficulty; 
cultural difference. 
3. Managerial and 
administrative imperfection; 
bureaucracy and capital 
escape. 
4. ‘China threat’; huge need 
for natural resources; 
aggressive expansions. 
5. Threats from foreign 
MNEs. 
 
 Table 6-4  Internal entry mode influencing factors of CSOE in EU 
 
 
Internal entry 
mode 
influencing 
factors of CSOE 
in EU 
Concerning 
Aspects 
Impacts 
on 
G/M&A 
Choice 
Impacts 
on 
WOS/JV 
Choice 
Advantage 
Transfer Start 
Point Factors 
Enterprise 
product and 
service factor 
Product and sector 
advantage 
√ √ 
Motivation 
Technology and 
resource pursuit, 
brand effect 
√ √ 
Developing 
strategy 
Expansion strategy √ √ 
Company 
performance 
Product and sector 
advantage 
√ √ 
Investment 
experience in the 
host country 
Experience √ √ 
CSOE Special 
Characteristics: 
Strengths 
Special 
Ownership 
Structure 
Sector advantage; 
encouragement on 
technology and 
resource pursuit 
√ √ 
Large-scale in 
Size, Resource 
Centralization 
Ownership 
advantage; product 
and sector 
advantage 
√ √ 
Policy Support 
Encouragement on 
technology and 
resource pursuit; 
expansion strategy 
√  
Prerogative 
Financing 
Channels 
All aspects √ √ 
Reputation and 
Reliability 
All aspects √ √ 
 
 
  
Source of Table 5-1:  
 
Release of Country/Region Report on China’s Outward Investment Promotion. And 
SAIC Official website, websites of Economic and Commercial Counsellors’ Office of 
The Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Communities, Hisense, 
Changhong Electric Corporation, SAIC, HMCT, China Minmetals Corporation 
 
